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TEXTUALISM AS FAIR NOTICE?
Benjamin Minhao Chen*
Abstract: The opportunity to know the law is one of the bedrocks of legality. It is also a
powerful and attractive reason for giving statutory language the meaning it has in everyday
discourse. To do otherwise would be to hide the law from those it governs.
Or so the argument goes. Despite its intuitive force, the fair notice argument for textualism
is vulnerable to two challenges. The first challenge is to the notion that fair notice requires
congruence between ordinary and legal meaning. There is no normative gauge for determining
the time and expense people ought to spend learning their legal obligations or the amount of
skill they should be expected to possess. And fair notice is not necessarily impaired by recourse
to extratextual sources so long as the rules of interpretation tell officials and citizens which
materials to consult and which approach to adopt when reading law. The second challenge
arises from the relationship between law, morality, and notice. Social expectations and ethical
norms may provide the requisite notice. Alternatively, they may render notice less essential.
Fair notice is either superfluous or satisfied where the community regards the proscribed
behavior as wrongful and the punishment fitting. Conversely, the demands of fair notice are
heightened when the behavior reached by the statute is innocuous or when the sanctions for
violation are disproportionate.
The vigor of these two challenges is empirically tested through a survey experiment fielded
on a probability sample of the United States adult population by the National Opinion Research
Center at the University of Chicago. The results indicate that lay judgments of fair notice are
influenced by the severity of the legal consequences. They also suggest that conditional on
outcome, judicial reliance on legislative purpose and history offends popular notions of fair
notice only when the law tells courts to privilege the ordinary meaning of statutes. The findings
call into question conventional wisdom about textualism, fair notice, and the rule of law.
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INTRODUCTION
A sign reads “No vehicles in the park.”1 An ambulance drives up to the
gate, responding to a medical emergency on the premises.2 May it enter?
A child rides a bicycle past the bollards.3 Should the child be ticketed? A
veteran association wishes to have a tank displayed on the grounds as a
tribute to those who fought so that others might live.4 Does the association
need to seek an exception? One way of answering these questions is to
inquire how English speakers normally understand the word “vehicles.”
In ordinary usage, a “vehicle” refers to “a means of carrying or
transporting something,”5 or more specifically, “[a] means of conveyance
or transport on land, having wheels, runners, or the like; a car, cart, truck,
carriage, sledge, etc.”6 On these definitions, an ambulance and a bicycle
are both “vehicles” and thus barred from the park.7 A tank would be too,
if it were in good working order. Another way of resolving the
conundrums posed by the ambulance, the bicycle, and the tank is to ask
why the rule against vehicles exists. Is its purpose to reduce noise
pollution, in which case there would be little reason to exclude the bicycle
and the tank? Or is its purpose to mitigate the risk of collisions, in which
the bicycle but not the tank would be prohibited? And if the purpose of
the rule is to promote public safety, then the ambulance should, perhaps,
be exempted.
How should we arbitrate between these competing approaches? The
authority that promulgated the rule may have intended for it to be applied
1. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607
(1958).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630, 663 (1958).
5. Vehicle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vehicle
[https://perma.cc/E4EM-BNQ6].
6. Vehicle, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017).
7. Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726, 768 (2020).
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in a certain fashion. There might be concerns about the potential for
arbitrariness if the person who enforces the rules is given too much
discretion to construe them. And even if enforcement were uniform, there
lurks the danger of the rule-maker’s intent being subverted in the guise of
interpretation. In addition, it may seem unfair if those subject to the rule
cannot discern its precise boundaries and must therefore guess as to what
is permitted and what is forbidden. This last concern has often been cited
in favor of giving statutory words and phrases their ordinary meaning, that
is, the meaning they convey in everyday conversation. 8 An emphatic
articulation of this idea proclaims that “[f]rom the inception of Western
culture, fair notice has been recognized as an essential element of the rule
of law”: “[b]y seeking to discern the most reasonable, plain meaning of a
statute, textualism by its very definition seeks to satisfy th[e] dictate of
fair notice.”9 This line of reasoning—dubbed the fair notice argument for
textualism—is elaborated in Part I.10
The fair notice argument is as easy to state as it is forceful. How could
it ever be fair to punish without warning? But despite its intuitive appeal,
the argument turns out, on closer examination, to be deeply problematic.
First, suppose the sign had also informed prospective park users that the
rule “No vehicles in the park” would be construed liberally and
purposively to minimize accidents in the park. Are teenage daredevils
fined for riding a skateboard truly denied fair notice? After all, they have
already been told how the rule would be read. Second, suppose a wealthy
entrepreneur rides a helicopter around the park, shaving some trees along
the way, thinking that the helicopter, not being “[a] means of conveyance
or transport on land, having wheels, runners, or the like” 11 was not
comprehended by the ban on vehicles. Can the entrepreneur, when fined,
legitimately complain about the want of fair notice? After all, rule or no
rule, the entrepreneur ought to have known better and the fine is, all things
considered, rather light given the egregiousness of the conduct. Part II
articulates and develops these difficulties for the fair notice argument.
How then do ordinary citizens—the subjects of the law—think about
fair warning? Does resorting to extra-statutory indicia of meaning really
offend lay notions of fair notice? Do lay judgments of fair notice turn on
the nature of the behavior being regulated and the harshness of the
punishment meted out? Part III presents the design and results of a survey
8. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he acid test
of whether a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could use the word in that
sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you funny.”).
9. Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 543, 557 (2009).
10. See id. at 557.
11. Vehicle, supra note 6.
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experiment fielded on a probability sample of adults in the United States.
Based on a well-known case decided by the Supreme Court, the
experiment tests the fair notice argument where it is at its strongest: in the
criminal domain. To presage the findings, the experiment suggests that—
conditional on outcome—judicial reliance on legislative purpose and
history does not evoke fair notice objections except, perhaps, when the
law instructs courts to privilege the ordinary meaning of the statute.
Furthermore, legal consequences matter for lay judgments of fair notice.
When penalties for breaching the law were heavy, subjects were
disinclined to say that fair warning had been given. The survey experiment
substantiates the two philosophical difficulties for the fair notice
argument. To recapitulate, it does not always violate fair notice to glean
statutory meaning from extra-textual resources, especially if the law of
interpretation so permits. Moreover, fair notice is not only a matter of
interpretation but also the distance between what people imagine the law
to be and what it actually says.
How do the empirical results bear on contemporary debates in statutory
interpretation? Part IV draws out the normative implications for two
recent proposals for reading statutes. The first advocates legislative or
judicial initiative in harmonizing interpretive methodology. Agreement
on a set of rules for construing statutes, it has been submitted, is more
important than the choice of any one rule. The second champions the rule
of strict construction redux. The rule of lenity should kick in before any
recourse is had to extra-statutory materials. Furthermore, the degree of
ambiguity needed for lenity to apply should depend on the punitiveness
of the law. Both proposals do find some support in lay understandings of
fair notice. Part IV also considers an ancient maxim of legal construction
that should, perhaps, be revived on fair notice grounds: optima legum
interpres consuetudo. A widely shared and long-standing reading of a
statute should be upheld, even if it is not the best reading. Ultimately, the
philosophical and quantitative analyses offered in this Article throw doubt
on conventional wisdom about the relationship between textualism and
fair notice. Fair notice does not ineluctably require textualism.
I.

TEXTUALISM AS FAIR NOTICE

Pithily encapsulated, textualism is “[t]he exclusive reliance on text
when interpreting text.”12 “[I]n its purest form,” it “begins and ends with
what the text says and fairly implies.” 13 According to John Manning,
12. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 16 (2012).
13. Id.
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textualists privilege semantic context whereas their adversaries, the
purposivists, prioritize policy context. 14 This distinction relates to the
kinds of material these jurists consider and the conclusions they draw
from the evidence. Because textualists are interested in “the way a
reasonable person conversant with relevant social and linguistic practices
would have used the words,”15 they try “to assemble the various pieces of
linguistic data, dictionary definitions, and canons into the best (most
coherent, most explanatory) account of the meaning of the statute.”16 In
contrast, because purposivists are interested in “the way a reasonable
person conversant with the circumstances underlying enactment would
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy,” 17 they “examin[e] all
available clues to figure out what Congress was really driving at,”
deriving aid from “the tenor of the statute, patterns of policy reflected in
similar legislation, or statements of purpose found in the legislative
history.”18 This last, extratextual, source is anathema to the textualist, so
much so that William Eskridge once described “the new textualism’s most
distinctive feature is its insistence that judges should almost never consult,
and never rely on, the legislative history of a statute.”19
Textualism, however, is not literalism. 20 The ordinary meaning of
language, textualists readily acknowledge, is illuminated by context. 21
14. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 91
(2006).
15. Id. at 91.
16. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351, 372 (1994).
17. Manning, supra note 14.
18. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 121 (2011).
19. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH L. REV. 1509, 1512 (1998)
(reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997)); see also AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 279 (Sari Bashi trans., 2005)
(“New textualists do not . . . under any circumstances, allow interpreters to consult legislative
history . . . .”); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1833 (1998) (“Intentionalists and
textualists have vigorously debated whether judges should consult legislative history in statutory
interpretation cases.”); Manning, supra note 18, at 115 (observing that “[a]ll of the nontextualist
Justices [then on the Court] [we]re willing to consult legislative history as evidence of statutory
meaning”).
20. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 19, at 16, 24 (qualifying that a “good textualist” is neither
a “literalist” nor a “nihilist”).
21. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 64 (1994) (“Because interpretation is a social enterprise, because words
have no natural meanings, and because their effect lies in context, we must consult these contexts.”);
Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 443 (1990)
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Words, for instance, can be ambiguous or vague. A word is ambiguous
when it has multiple meanings. The noun “bank,” for instance, might
connote a financial institution or the land adjoining a river. A word is
vague when the concept or predicate it signifies lacks sharp boundaries.
Does the adjective “tall,” for example, apply to a baby giraffe that stands
at six feet? Semantic and situational cues may render precise that which
was unclear. “The derelict lawyer was sanctioned by the bar association”
intimates, on its face, punishment rather than approval. Beyond ambiguity
and vagueness, the extension of terms might depend on where, why, and
how they are used. A kindergarten teacher instructed to show the children
a game should understand that the word “game,” though capacious,
excludes activities that involve drinking even if they amuse or entertain.22
New textualism thus abjures the idea that statutes have plain meanings
inscribed “within the[ir] four corners.”23 Instead, it counsels sensitivity to
the time, circumstance, purpose, and structure of an enactment.24 Today,
“[i]n textual interpretation, context is everything.”25
Purposivists, for their part, have renounced the creed embodied by
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,26 “that a thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
(“Textualists, like other users of language, want to know its context, including assumptions shared by
the speakers and the intended audience.”). According to Tara Leigh Grove, “[m]odern textualists
have . . . long insisted that the method is not literalism.” Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which
Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 279 (2020). This qualification can, however, be found in an
early American treatise on statutory interpretation. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE
WRITTEN LAW AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 61 (1882) (“[T]he rule of law is distinct, that the courts
cannot resort to the opinions of the individual legislators, the legislative journals, the reports of
committees, or the speeches made at the time an act was passed; their sole guide being the language,
illumined simply as already shown. They do not close their eyes to what they know of the history of
the country and of the law, of the condition of the law at the particular time, of the public necessities
felt, and other like things.”).
22. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 38e (P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim
Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte trans., 4th ed. 2009) (“Someone
says to me, ‘Show the children a game.’ I teach them gambling with dice, and the other says, ‘I didn’t
mean that sort of game’. In that case, must he have had the exclusion of the game with dice before his
mind when he gave me the order?” (internal citation omitted)).
23. White v. United States, 191 U.S. 545, 551 (1903); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225
U.S. 282, 293 (1912).
24. Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.)
(“Language in general, and legislation in particular, is a social enterprise to which both speakers and
listeners contribute, drawing on background understandings and the structure and circumstances of
the utterance. Slicing a statute into phrases while ignoring their contexts—the surrounding words, the
setting of the enactment, the function a phrase serves in the statutory structure—is a formula for
disaster.”); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1615 (1991) (“[I]nsofar as the label suggests a simple and literal meaning of
the statutory text at issue, it betrays the sophistication and complexity of Justice Scalia’s approach.”).
25. SCALIA, supra note 20, at 37.
26. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”27 They hold that “[t]he
words of a statute, taken in their context, serve both as guides in the
attribution of general purpose and as factors limiting the particular
meanings that can properly be attributed.”28 Is there any daylight, then,
between contemporary textualists and purposivists since the former are
willing to accommodate purpose 29 and the latter profess themselves
constrained by text?30 Some argue that the opposition between the two
schools has narrowed to one of degree, rather than kind, becoming “a
difference in emphasis rather than a sharp disagreement over
methodology.” 31 For example, textualists and purposivists apparently
wrangle over when context should be consulted—before or after arriving
at a statute’s clear textual meaning.32 But Jonathan Molot contends that
insofar as “both schools use the same interpretive tools to reach the same
interpretive result, it really does not matter if one purports to use context
to decide on a textual meaning while the other admits that it is adjusting
the text’s meaning to reconcile it with the context.”33 In that sense, one
could say that “we’re all textualists now,”34 and purposivists too.35
It might thus be suggested that the debate between textualism and
purposivism is not only well-worn but passé. But the consensus that text
and purpose are both integral to the process of construing statutes is
fragile. Textualists chafe at the purposivists’ easy and frequent recourse
to legislative history. 36 And though justices of all stripes incant the
27. Id. at 459.
28. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1375 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994);
BARAK, supra note 19, at 19 (“Every meaning that an interpreter gives a legal text must have an
Archimedean foothold in the language of the text.”).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1998) (Scalia, J.) (stating that “[t]he
answer [to a question of statutory interpretation] is to be found by examining the purpose of the
[statute and] the entirety of its text”).
30. Manning, supra note 18, at 129–46.
31. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
32. Id. at 37.
33. Id. at 37–38.
34. Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the
Reading of Statutes at 08:29, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg [https://perma.cc/6KYU-RM6P] (statement of Justice Elena Kagan).
35. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
531, 532 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor
Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275 (2020).
36. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 369–90; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (“The new textualism posits that once the Court has ascertained a
statute’s plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant. Legislative history
should not even be consulted to confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text.”); Molot, supra note
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primacy of text,37 recall the canons,38 and narrate the zeitgeist surrounding
legislation, 39 the same evidence may be admitted to prove different
things.40 At risk of belaboring the point: textualists search for the ordinary
meaning of statutory language—how a citizen or legislator of the times
would have understood the words used—whereas purposivists seek to
imbue the text with a meaning that furthers the objectives sought to be
achieved by the legislation. Hence, when Justice Alito, dissenting in
Bostock v. Clayton County,41 recounted the animus borne by American
society towards its homosexual members in 1960s, he did so not to divine
the intent or purpose of the legislators who passed Title VII in 1964.
Instead he did so to illuminate what Congress meant to say when it made
it “unlawful . . . for an employer to . . . discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex” 42 and what people
heard.43 And while Justice Kavanaugh, also dissenting in Bostock, cited
the bills introduced in the 1970s to prohibit workplace discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, he did so not to show what Congress
thought it had accomplished in Title VII but to “further demonstrate the

31, at 38 (“Textualists tend to exclude one particular piece of evidence: legislative history.”); Richard
M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 407, 411 (2015) (describing legislative history as
“the New Textualism’s ultimate bugaboo”).
37. Simmons v. Himmelreich, 578 U.S. 621, 627 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.) (“Absent persuasive
indications to the contrary, we presume Congress says what it means and means what it says.”).
38. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 545 (2015) (Ginsburg, J.) (“A canon related to noscitur
a sociis, ejusdem generis, counsels: ‘[W]here general words follow specific words in a statutory
enumeration, the general words are [usually] construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’”).
39. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1769 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“For most 21st-century Americans, it is painful to be reminded of the way our society once treated
gays and lesbians, but any honest effort to understand what the terms of Title VII were understood to
mean when enacted must take into account the societal norms of that time. And the plain truth is that
in 1964 homosexuality was thought to be a mental disorder, and homosexual conduct was regarded
as morally culpable and worthy of punishment.”).
40. As Justice Scalia clarified extrajudicially,
[u]sing legislative history to establish what the legislature ‘intended’ is quite different from using
it for other purposes. For example, for the purpose of establishing linguistic usage—showing
that a particular word or phrase is capable of bearing a particular meaning—it is no more
forbidden (though no more persuasive) to quote a statement from the floor debate on the statute
in question than it is to quote the Wall Street Journal or the Oxford English Dictionary.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 388; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in
Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 91 (2017) (“Like most other textualists, I am willing
to consult legislative history as a cue to linguistic usage, even though not as an authoritative guide to
meaning.”).
41. 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (a)(1)) (emphasis added).
43. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1769 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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widespread usage of the English language in the United States.”44
In contrast to the foregoing examples, Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr 45
probed legislative history for clues as to whether Congress intended the
“questions of law” reviewable by a court when a non-citizen is being
removed for crimes to include the application of a legal standard to
undisputed or established facts. 46 Writing for a majority of the Court,
Justice Breyer distilled from the House Conference Report a desire not to
“change the scope of review that criminal aliens currently receive [under
habeas corpus]”47 as established in INS v. St. Cyr.48 “Notably,” Justice
Breyer continued, “the legislative history indicate[d] that Congress was
well aware of the state of the law in the courts of appeals in light of St.
Cyr.”49 The rival approaches in statutory interpretation thus continue to
produce divergent results with palpable consequences for the parties and
the public.50
If courts are to be faithful agents of the legislature—as all sides now
seem to agree—why not implement the statute in a manner that furthers
its purpose?51 Why fixate on the particular words chosen by the legislature
to express its will? And why should judges avert their eyes from
legislative history? “Where the mind labours to discover the design of the
legislature, [shouldn’t] it seize[] every thing from which aid can be
derived[?]” 52 Jurists have drawn on constitutional and public choice
theory to answer these questions. It is the text of the bill, not the speeches
delivered in the House or Senate, that becomes law upon bicameral
passage and presentment. “If all the legislators in the halls of Congress or
outside, in exactly similar words orally uttered what was in their minds,”
wrote Max Radin, “that would not be a statute and therefore no law. They
are empowered to make law only in one fashion and that is by voting on
44. Id. at 1830 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
45. 589 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020).
46. Id. at 1072.
47. Id.
48. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
49. Guerrero-Lasprilla, 140 S. Ct. at 1072; cf. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 96–
97 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (rejecting the argument that expert witness fees were recoverable under a clause
allowing recovery of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” since the statute in question was passed to overrule
a prior Supreme Court decision which abolished a judicial doctrine permitting equitable fee-shifting).
50. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 579 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018) (demonstrating
how the outcome of a case can turn on the preference given to semantic as opposed to policy context).
51. Cf. Douglas Payne, The Intention of the Legislature in the Interpretation of Statutes, 9 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 96, 105 (1956) (“The proper office of a judge in statutory interpretation is not, I
suggest, the lowly mechanical one implied by orthodox doctrine, but that of a junior partner in the
legislative process, a partner empowered and expected within certain limits to exercise a proper
discretion as to what the detailed law should be.”).
52. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.).
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proposed statutes.” 53 Moreover, even if the legislators were united in
suppressing a particular mischief, they might have divided on the kinds of
trade-off they were willing to entertain to further their common end. “[N]o
legislation pursues its purpose at all costs” and “it frustrates rather than
effectuates legislative intent to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s
primary objective must be the law.”54 And while legislative history might
sometimes be helpful, textualists concede, 55 it is also apt to mislead. 56
Stray remarks by a congressperson may be insincere and do not, in any
event, represent the mood of the entire chamber. 57 Worse, legislative
history is liable to be manufactured. Interest groups unable to have their
preferences enacted into law might insert language into the floor speeches
and committee reports to subvert judicial interpretation of the bill that did
pass.58 Furthermore, by elevating the “unenacted hopes and dreams”59 of
lawmakers and their constituencies over the ordinary meaning of statutory
text, judges unravel political bargains and negate the protections afforded
to minority interests by the legislative process.60
53. Max Radin, A Case Study in Statutory Interpretation: Western Union Co. vs. Lenroot, 33
CALIF. L. REV. 219, 223 (1945); see also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws,
not by the intentions of legislators . . . . If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the
whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising candidate
than legislative history.” (emphasis in original)).
54. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam).
55. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (“To decode words one
must frequently reconstruct the legal and political culture of the drafters. Legislative history may be
invaluable in revealing the setting of the enactment and the assumptions its authors entertained about
how their words would be understood.”); see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 388.
56. Manning, supra note 14, at 84 (acknowledging that “textualists generally forego reliance on
legislative history as an authoritative source of [a statute’s apparent overall] such purpose, but that
reaction goes to the reliability and legitimacy of a certain type of evidence of purpose rather than to
the use of purpose as such”).
57. FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 77 (2008)
(“Legislators speak on the floor for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is pandering to their
constituents. Relying on such speeches runs the risk of adopting as policy something the individual
legislator did not intend to enact, much less the entire Congress.”).
58. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 377
(1987) (“It is well known that technocrats, lobbyists and attorneys have created a virtual cottage
industry in fashioning legislative history so that the Congress will appear to embrace their particular
view in a given statute.”).
59 . See Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 343 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause commands that the ‘[l]aws of the United States,’ not the
unenacted hopes and dreams of the Department of Transportation, ‘shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.’”).
60. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1288–90 (2010)
(elucidating a shift in how textualism is defended, away from the factually questionable claim that
the legislative process is dominated by interested groups towards the less empirically ambitious

Chen (Do Not Delete)

2022]

6/21/22 10:26 AM

TEXTUALISM AS FAIR NOTICE?

349

But an old and powerful argument for taking the ordinary meaning of
legislative text as the lodestar of statutory interpretative invokes fair
notice. 61 Fair warning is so fundamental to the rule of law that it is
sometimes described as inhering in the very concept of law itself.62 “For
the law not to be known,” one author declares, “is the ultimate injustice.”63
Secret legislation is morally repugnant because it does not give any notice
of the demands being laid on subjects. Those punished for violating a
hidden decree had no opportunity to avoid the heavy hand of justice. By
the same token, requiring citizens to divine the private intentions of
lawmakers is a “tyrannical” imposition, akin to Nero’s “trick” of “posting
assumption that any incongruence between a statute and its purpose might be due to political
compromise rather than inadvertence or incompetence).
61. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 543–48 (tracing the notion of fair notice back to Athenian
Greece); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35
STAN. L. REV. 213, 233 (1983) (explaining that “formalism’s strength rests not only on the democratic
principle that statutory commands must limit judicial creativity; it also rests on our belief that the rule
of law demands fair notice and certainty, a belief that has special force in the realm of statutes”);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321, 340 (1990) (“The arguments for textualism are strong ones. . . . [T]extualism
appeals to the rule-of-law value that citizens ought to be able to read the statute books and know their
rights and duties.”); Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1828 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (chiding “[a] literalist approach to interpreting phrases [as] disrespect[ing]
ordinary meaning and depriv[ing] the citizenry of fair notice of what the law is”); Strawbridge v.
Mann, 17 Ga. 454, 458–59 (1855) (“But as a general thing, with respect to the Acts of our own
Legislature, I should feel myself rigorously bound down to the words. The words of those Acts are,
what the great majority of the people of the State shape their actions by. It is the words only, that are
published to them—and when, after they have followed the words of the law, they are told by the
Courts that they have not followed the law, they feel, that for them, the law has been turned into a
snare. And it is difficult to say that they have not the right so to feel.”); Black-Clawson Int’l Ltd. v.
Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G. [1975] AC 591 (HL) 638 (Diplock L.J.) (“The acceptance
of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before committing himself to
any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal consequences that will
flow from it. Where those consequences are regulated by a statute the source of that knowledge is
what the statute says. In construing it the court must give effect to what the words of the statute would
be reasonably understood to mean by those whose conduct it regulates. That any or all of the
individual members of the two Houses of the Parliament that passed it may have thought the words
bore a different meaning cannot affect the matter. Parliament, under our constitution, is sovereign
only in respect of what it expresses by the words used in the legislation it has passed.”).
62. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 49–51 (1964); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW 214 (1979); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80 (1994); Christopher Kutz, Secret Law and
the Value of Publicity, 22 RATIO JURIS. 197, 211 (2009); Natalie Stoljar, Survey Article:
Interpretation, Indeterminacy and Authority: Some Recent Controversies in Philosophy of Law, 11 J.
POL. PHIL. 470, 482 (2003); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (“Living
under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids.’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939))); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . of
the conduct that will subject him to punishment . . . .”).
63. FRANCIS A.R. BENNION & OLIVER JONES, BENNION ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 731 (6th
ed. 2013).
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edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read.”64 And
referring them to legislative history “is not unlike the practice of Caligula,
who reportedly ‘wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them
up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people.’”65 In
short, privileging extra-textual indicia of meaning over the plain meaning
of the statutory text is reminiscent of the artifices of ancient dictators and
is unworthy of a modern liberal democracy.66 Conversely, giving statutory
language the meaning it bears in normal discourse ensures that people are
apprised of their legal rights and duties.67 Ordinary meaning is thus the
“linchpin of statutory interpretation.” 68 Following ordinary meaning is
“Statutory Interpretation 101.”69
II.

TWO KINDS OF DIFFICULTIES

The fair notice argument for textualism is seemingly irresistible.70 “If
[people] have to wait until an adjudicator reveals what the rules are,
interpreting texts in light of materials that are not readily available or
64. SCALIA, supra note 20, at 17.
65. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *46 (1765)); see
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (“Congress did not define what it desired to punish
but referred the citizen to a comprehensive law library in order to ascertain what acts were prohibited.
To enforce such a statute would be like sanctioning the practice of Caligula who ‘published the law,
but it was written in a very small hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could make a copy
of it.’”) (citation omitted); OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 52 (1989) (“If the average citizen is presumed to be aware of the legislative history
as well as the statute, are we then enforcing not simply an unknown but almost unknowable laws?”).
66. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 186 (1981)
(explaining that reliance on “non-linguistic context presupposes that a court’s proper role is to
determine what the legislature meant by its utterance, rather than what the words uttered mean” is “a
controversial proposition of political theory that values obedience to legislative wishes over the giving
of fair notice”).
67. Note, supra note 9, at 543; see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114
NW. U. L. REV. 269, 318 (2019) (arguing that for a legal regime to be morally legitimate, judges must
respect widely shared intuitions about statutory meaning even though such intuitions are theoretically
unfounded); see also DIGGORY BAILEY & LUKE NORBURY, BENNION ON STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 707 (7th ed. 2017) (“[T]here is a close connection between predictability and
grammatical construction. If the grammatical meaning were clear the citizen would have all the
information needed to decide on action which may have legal consequences.”).
68. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND
81 (2016).

THE CONSTITUTION

69. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
70. Raff Donelson & Ivar R. Hannikainen, Fuller and the Folk: The Inner Morality of Law
Revisited, in OXFORD STUDIES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 6, 16–17 (Tania Lombrozo, Joshua
Knobe & Shaun Nichols eds., 2020) (finding that of Fuller’s eight principles, publicity is the one most
endorsed by survey respondents).
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whose meaning is uncertain and unpredictable . . . they will lack notice of
relevant legal requirements until it is too late.”71 To avoid “ensnar[ing]
the people,” legal officials should read statutes like the laypeople do.72
This principle is easy enough to state but it begs the question: how do
laypeople read statutes? The simple answer, it seems, is that most of them
don’t. Most people assume, rightly, that some acts are so evil or dangerous
they are everywhere prohibited. But few people have the occasion or
indeed the inclination to pore over law books.73 This oft-acknowledged
fact is potentially embarrassing for the fair notice argument.74 If hardly
anyone reads statutes, why insist on publication? Why elevate ordinary
meaning?
A.

The Congruence of Legal and Ordinary Meanings

Now, it might be argued that fair notice is essential to legality as long
as there is one person who seeks to educate themselves about the law.75
“This citizen,” Lon Fuller holds, “is entitled to know,” and because
“[they] cannot be identified in advance,” society must take the
“trouble . . . to make the laws generally available.”76 The same reasoning
71. Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 102; see also Neil MacCormick, Argumentation and Interpretation in Law, 6
RATIO JURIS. 16, 22 (1993).
72. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see
Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free
Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 984 (2004) (“Textualists could be seen
as advocating interpreting legal texts as would some sample of average members of the public. Such
a method might be thought by some to have rule of law benefits, particularly in giving the average
citizen clear notice of what the law means.”).
73. As Lon Fuller mused, “the full text of [more esoteric laws] might be distributed on every street
corner and not one man in a hundred would ever read it.” FULLER, supra note 62, at 51. Indeed, studies
conducted in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s showed that “quite often knowledge about specific laws
is rather poor in those specific groups for which the laws were made” and that public knowledge
concerning legal topics is considerably poorer than presumed by the legal authorities and by many
scholars. Berl Kutchinsky, ‘The Legal Consciousness’: A Survey of Research on Knowledge and
Opinion About Law, in KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION ABOUT LAW 101, 103–05 (Adam Podgorecki,
Wolfgang Kaupen, J. van Houtte, P. Vinke & Berl Kutchinsky eds., 1973) (emphasis in original).
74. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 886 (2004)
(“The [notice] theory [of the rule of lenity] is flawed because criminals do not read statutes . . . .”);
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV.
189, 219–20 (1985) (arguing that unfair surprise “does not apply to the generality of cases where there
is no plausible suggestion that the actor either knew or cared what the law was”); David Luban,
Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 585 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010)
(labeling the idea “that publishing the law in some officially sanctioned manner places people on
notice of it” a “fiction”).
75. FULLER, supra note 62, at 51.
76. Id.
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might be advanced to support the paramountcy of statutory language.
Giving legal text its ordinary meaning fulfills the expectations of the rare
person who does read statutes. But does the conclusion—a rule of
ordinary meaning—follow from the premise—fair notice? Fuller adverts
to the impossibility of knowing, ex ante, who might take an interest in the
laws. This predicament might exist at the founding of a legal order. But it
fades as habits and patterns harden over time. Suppose that many years in,
we know something about the people who read statutes. They are, say,
loath to use the internet and frequently visit their local libraries. Doesn’t
this mean that it is sufficient to have enrolled bills exhibited in all the
libraries and not enough for them to be only published online? And
suppose that these individuals also examine legislative history to figure
out a statute’s meaning.77 Shouldn’t legal officials then do the same? To
summarize, the contention that fair notice is important because some
individuals do consult statutes begs the question of how these same people
find and understand the law. The intuitive leap from fair notice to ordinary
meaning has to survive this empirical chasm.78
But even if we could observe the actual readers of statutes and get
inside their minds, it is strange for the importance of fair notice to hinge
on the odd person or two who cracks open the statute books. Fuller
colorfully illustrates eight principles of legality through the story of Rex,
supreme monarch and “bungling” lawmaker.79 To Rex’s list of travails we
might add the case of the apathetic populace: only one subject in the
kingdom has ever displayed any curiosity in the king’s code. Will it do,

77. See James A. Macleod, Finding Original Public Meaning, 56 GA. L. REV. 1, 14 n.51 (“Ordinary
people might also treat various publicly available sources of information (perhaps even legislative
history or legislative history as filtered through popular media) as relevant to determining statutory
meaning. In short, ordinary people don’t systematically ignore information relevant to (individual or
group) speakers’ intent, as textualists contend judges ought to do when the text is clear on its face.”);
cf. Kent Greenawalt, Are Mental States Relevant for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation?, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1609, 1663 (2000) (“Readers of laws recognize that they are reading formal
prescriptions backed by the coercive power of the state. A great majority of modern statutory language
bears little resemblance to the language of ordinary discourse, and even when the language is similar
to ordinary discourse, a reader knows that a statutory provision is not the same as a remark made by
a next-door neighbor.”).
78. See Noel Struchiner, Ivar R Hannikainen & Guilherme da F.C.F. de Almeida, An Experimental
Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 15 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 312, 315 (2020) (finding that
“people spontaneously consider both a rule’s text and its purpose when determining whether a
particular incident constitutes an infraction”); Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria Nourse,
Statutory Interpretation from the Outside, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 275 (2022) (finding that “across
a range of cases, people interpret rules with an intuitive anti-literalism” (emphasis in original));
Macleod, supra note 77, at 45–46 (enumerating the extratextual factors people might “treat[] as
relevant to interpreting statutes, regardless of how informed or uninformed one imagines [them] to
be” (emphasis in original)).
79. FULLER, supra note 62, at 33–38.
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then, for emendations to be sent to that one subject by registered mail, the
others having displayed a lackadaisical attitude to their own legal
education? When accused of secret legislation, could Rex say in his
defense: “There is no point in sending copies to you lot. You will not read
them”? The answer to both questions must surely be no. This hypothetical
demonstrates that whether fair notice is given depends not merely on the
realized state of affairs but also on how things might have turned out in a
range of possible but unrealized scenarios.80 In the case of the apathetic
populace, fair notice turns on whether uninterested subjects could have
found the law had they bothered to try. To ask whether fair notice has been
served is to engage in a counterfactual inquiry. The “one [person] in a
hundred [who] takes the pains to inform [themselves]”81 about their rights
and duties is a red herring because it ultimately does not matter whether
anyone pays attention to the laws. The rule of law is satisfied if those
addressed by a statute have a reasonable opportunity to learn it. Such
opportunity is available, for example, when the conventions governing the
publication and interpretation of statutes are easy to discover and follow.
Fair notice may therefore be given by a statute that in theory could be—
but in practice is not—seen by anyone.
Take the foregoing to be true. Is the textualist insistence on ordinary
meaning then entailed by fair notice, defined as a reasonable opportunity
to know the law’s contents? At first blush, the inference is compelling.82
But a moment’s reflection should give us pause. The intuitive leap from
fair notice to ordinary meaning rule proceeds from familiar, casual,
encounters with law. The stroller in the park who comes across a
prohibition on ball games, say, or a visitor to the hospital who is greeted
by a ban on smoking. Common experience suggests that most individuals
treat these rules as commands from an authoritative speaker. Without
resorting to extraneous indicia of meaning, they confidently attribute to
terms and phrases the sense they carry in everyday conversation. It is
therefore natural to suppose that hypothetical readers of statutes do the
same, and thence, that fair notice requires statutory language be given its
ordinary meaning. This generalization, however, suffers from two defects.
First, signs in parks and hospitals are usually intended as simple on-thespot directives to laypeople going about their own business. As such, it is
80 . See PHILIP PETTIT, THE ROBUST DEMANDS OF THE GOOD 2 (2015) (describing robustly
demanding goods); see also Nicholas Southwood, Democracy as a Modally Demanding Value, 49
NOÛS 504, 505 (2015) (claiming that self-rule is a modally demanding value).
81. FULLER, supra note 62, at 51.
82. Note, supra note 9, at 557; Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary
Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 874 (2018) (“A concern for fair notice and protection of reliance
interests may well direct us to stop at the top-of-mind sense of a statutory term.”).
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silly for anyone to try to interpret these signs by reference to something
more than their text. The same, however, may not be said of broad
instructions to administrative agencies and complex statutory regimes
addressed to sophisticated entities and their high-powered lawyers.83 The
pharmaceutical company trying to bring a new drug to the market is very
differently situated from the couple who persist in walking their dogs on
a trail.84
But even if the extrapolation from trail signs to drug approval schemes
were warranted, a second, more fundamental, difficulty remains. If the
public construes statutes by giving them their ordinary meaning, then fair
notice counsels legal officials to do the same. But there is nothing
necessary about such a practice. There could be other conventions for
deriving legal meaning from statutory text, legal meaning being, roughly
speaking, the “content of the legal norm created by an authoritative
pronouncement.”85 Consider, for instance, the term “person.” As defined
by popular dictionaries, a “person,” is a “human,”86 an “individual,”87 “a
man, woman, or child.”88 But “person,” in legal usage, encompasses not
only “individual human being[s]” 89 but also corporations and
partnerships.90 If everyone is aware—or would have discovered had they
looked or asked—that “person” means different things in law than in life,
it is neither unfair nor a surprise for legal officials not to give the term its
ordinary meaning when it appears in a statute.91 Now, assume that the
83. David S. Louk, The Audiences of Statutes, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 137, 145 (2019).
84. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1603, 1608 (2000) (using the case of the devoted dog lovers to analyze the expressiveness of
law).
85 . Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 49 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011); see also Lawrence B. Solum,
Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 479 (2013) (distinguishing
between communicative content, “the linguistic meaning communicated by a legal text in context,”
and legal content, “the doctrines of the legal rules associated with a text”).
86. Person, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/person
[https://perma.cc/QR3K-NCGE].
87. Id.
88. Person, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2017).
89. Id.
90 . See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *122 (1765)
(“Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons or artificial. Natural persons are such
as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for the
purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.”); 1 U.S.C. § 1
(“[T]he word[] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”).
91. See Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1122–
23 (2008) (distinguishing between ordinary and plain meaning since technical language may have a
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very first page of the code tells readers that “where statutory language is
susceptible of two or more readings, the reading that furthers the purpose
of the legislature shall be preferred” and that “in discerning the purpose
of the legislature regard may be had to the legislative history of the
statute.”92 Why does it violate fair notice, then, for a court to interpret the
law purposively?93 If citizens are expected to know the law, why can’t
they also be expected to know the law of interpretation?
To sharpen the analysis, consider the kinds of obstacles that might deter
or stymie the hypothetical ordinary person trying to figure out the law.
The first kind relates to accessibility and the second, to determinacy.
Accessibility refers to the cost and difficulty of looking up the relevant
legal materials. Some materials may be readily available at the click of a
mouse; others may be buried in the archives of the Bodleian Libraries.
Determinacy, on the other hand, relates to the number of permissible
outcomes that remain once the law of interpretation has been properly
applied. The problem of indeterminacy may arise for at least two reasons.
One reason is the absence of methodological consensus. The law is
indeterminate because the legal community is split on how to construe
statutes and competing theories point in opposite directions. Another
reason is the elasticity or incoherence of the methods themselves. The law
is indeterminate because applying the stipulated method to the designated
materials does not produce agreement on the legal meaning of statutes.
The long-running dispute about the admissibility of legislative history
helps illustrate these distinctions. Critics object to judicial consideration

meaning which is plain to those who are legally trained); see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321, 1338
(2018) (pointing out that laypeople also realize that legal terms can bear technical meanings which
differ from the terms’ ordinary meanings). Indeed, textualists recognize technical language as
constituting an exception to the ordinary meaning rule. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 69
(“Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that
they bear a technical sense.”).
92. I abstract here from the issue of whether legislative bodies may legitimately instruct courts how
to interpret statutes, a question which implicates separation of powers rather than fair notice. SCALIA
& GARNER, supra note 12, at 245. I also acknowledge but will not address here the puzzle of how the
instructions given at the beginning of the code are themselves to be interpreted. See JOSEPH RAZ,
BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON
286 (2009) (“The legislator can make the mystic code the method of interpretation [f]or some or all
of his acts. All he has to do is express an intention that this be so. But, when he expresses that intention,
he will be doing so by an act which will be interpreted as such acts are normally interpreted by the
conventions prevailing at the time.”).
93. See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2008) (“The
[general] norms [supposed to govern people’s behavior] should be public knowledge in the sense of
being available to anyone who is sufficiently interested, and available in particular to those who make
a profession of being public norm-detectors (lawyers, as we call them) and who make that expertise
available to anyone who is willing to pay for it.” (emphasis in original)).
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of legislative history because it is costly to find and difficult to parse.94
Legislative history, they allege, is inaccessible. Detractors also argue that
legislative history does not meaningfully narrow the interpretive
possibilities available. Resorting to a diverse array of committee reports,
floor statements, and the like does not improve determinacy and might
even erode it.95 Furthermore, the lack of a governing theory of statutory
interpretation—a state of affairs compounded by the inapplicability of
stare decisis in this domain—breeds uncertainty and confusion about how
legislative history will be treated by the courts.96 Such unpredictability
impairs fair notice.97
With these distinctions in mind, it becomes clear that the fair notice
argument for textualism and against purposivism ultimately resolves to
empirical questions about the accessibility of the materials deemed
relevant by the rival approaches and determinacy of the methods
themselves. Is legislative history, for example, truly more inaccessible
than statutes? Caleb Nelson goes so far as to doubt whether “the
textualists’ position on legislative history really reflects special sensitivity
to the goal of fair notice, because the most widely used kinds of legislative
94. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396–97 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“Laws are intended for all of our people to live by; and the people go to law offices
to learn what their rights under those laws are. . . . Aside from a few offices in the larger cities, the
materials of legislative history are not available to the lawyer who can afford neither the cost of
acquisition, the cost of housing, or the cost of repeatedly examining the whole congressional
history. . . . To accept legislative debates to modify statutory provisions is to make the law
inaccessible to a large part of the country.”); OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note
65, at 52 (“If the average citizen is presumed to be aware of the legislative history as well as the
statute, are we then enforcing not simply unknown but almost unknowable laws?”).
95. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 20, at 36 (“In any major piece of legislation, the legislative history
is extensive, and there is something for everybody. As Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick
is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out your friends. The variety and specificity of result
that legislative history can achieve is unparalleled.”); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative
History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998) (“Legislative history
is often contradictory, giving courts a chance to pick and choose those bits which support the result
the judges want to reach.”).
96. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (“Principles of stare decisis, after all,
demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same.
Were that not so, those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon
which the rule of law depends.”); Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1875–1884 (2008); Evan J. Criddle & Glen
Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1576 (2014).
97. There are other criticisms of judicial resort to legislative history. Prominent among them is the
observation that committee reports and floor statements are unlikely to have been read, much less
assented to, by the legislators voting on the statute. Moreover, it is the text of the bill—and not the
trail of legislative history—that must undergo the rigors of bicameral passage and presentment to
become law. Allowing unenacted legislative history to dictate the import of statutory language permits
an end-run around the democratic process for making law. See also supra notes 51–55 and
accompanying text.
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history are now no less available to the citizenry than the statutory texts
they purport to explain.” 98 Now, studying both the legislation and its
history must surely be more expensive and laborious than examining the
statutory language alone.99 But this truism has little relevance insofar as
textualists and purposivists both admit legislative history, albeit for
distinct purposes.100
Does textualism give more definite answers, then, than purposivism?
Textualists answer in the affirmative: their prescriptions will “provide
greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and greater
respect for the rule of law.”101 But purposivists could equally argue the
reverse.102 Namely, that textualism “does not actually provide judges with
a means of putting aside social values and substantive jurisprudential
commitments,”103 and that judges who “speak about words in ‘context’
98. Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 367 (2005); see also HART & SACKS,
supra note 28, at 1247–52.
99. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 193 (2006).
100. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 731–
37 (1997) (approving “the use of legislative history to identify the events that precipitated the
enactment of legislation”); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988) (looking to the Senate
Report for the legislative impetus behind the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978); Cont’l Can Co. v.
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d
1154, 1156–57 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (relying on the speech of the bill’s floor manager
to confirm that “substantially all” as used in 29 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2) had a special legal meaning
“present to [the legislators’] minds”).
101. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at xxix; ESKRIDGE, supra note 68, at 36 (“Although
ordinary meaning does not always yield predictable answers to statutory issues, it seems to yield
greater predictability than any other single methodology.” (emphasis in original)).
102. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive
Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1231–32 (2010) (“[J]udges who regularly rely on the canons have
license to employ a systemic kind of discretion, in contrast to judges who regularly invoke legislative
history or agency deference.”); Eskridge, supra note 35, at 536 (“In any complex case, there will be
several canons on every side of the issue, and the unscrupulous judge will have many cherries to pick
under the approach favored by [textualists].”). Already in 1853, Chief Baron Pollock, an English
judge sitting on the Court of Exchequer, thought it was by no means evident that “if it were laid down
as a general rule, that the grammatical construction of a clause shall prevail over its legal meaning,
whether a more certain rule would be arrived at, than if it were laid down that its legal meaning shall
prevail over its grammatical construction.” Waugh v. Middleton (1853) 8 Exch. 352, 356. “In my
opinion,” he continued,
grammatical and philological disputes, and indeed all that belongs to the history of language, is
as obscure and leads to as many doubts and contentions as any question of law, and I do not,
therefore, feel sure that the rule, much as it has been commended, is on all occasions a sure and
certain guide.
Id. at 356–57.
103. Cary Franklin, Living Textualism, 2020 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 184; see also Anuj C. Desai, Text
Is Not Enough, 93 COLO. L. REV. 1, 43 (2022) (“But when semantics yield plausible competing
interpretations, the question of how much social context to consider will come to the fore. And
because there is no way to reconcile the competing semantic interpretations without social context,
and there is no preordained way to determine how much and what social context to consider, courts
have to rely on, and thus inevitably will rely on, other modes of analysis.” (emphasis in original)).
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and the ‘structure’ of a statute” yet blind themselves to “what the actual
players thought they were doing” are apt to give vent to their own
“assumptions, speculation, preferences, and notions of ‘sound public
policy.’” 104 These assertions might, perhaps, be testable. 105 An early
contribution found that before 1986, justices on the Supreme Court were
more likely to vote against their ideological dispositions in employment
cases when they relied on legislative history. 106 More recently, an
investigation into the use of interpretive tools in the Roberts Court found
forty-four cases over a five-and-a-half-term period that had “dueling”
opinions justifying opposing results by appealing to the ordinary meaning
rule.107 These quantitative studies do not conclusively prove purposivism
to be more determinate than textualism—or vice versa. To muster a
coalition, the justices may not faithfully reproduce their reasoning in the
opinions they author. Furthermore, whether judges arrive at outcomes
contrary to their own predilections is as much a matter of judicial
discipline as it is of the announced interpretative method. Last, it may
fairly be wondered whether generalization across cases is even
meaningful since so much depends on the statutory language and history
at issue. The best evidence so far reveals, however, that purposivism fares
no worse than textualism in narrowing the range of justifiable
outcomes.108 The rule of law advantages claimed for textualism are thus

104. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes
in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 304 (1990); see
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 800, 816–17 (1983) (“Vacuous and inconsistent as they mostly are, the canons do not constrain
judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to create the appearance that his decisions are
constrained. . . . By making statutory interpretation seem mechanical rather than creative, the canons
conceal, often from the reader of the judicial opinion and sometimes from the writer, the extent to
which the judge is making new law in the guise of interpreting a statute . . . . The judge who
recognizes the degree to which he is free rather than constrained in the interpretation of statutes, and
who refuses to make a pretense of constraint by parading the canons of construction in his opinions,
is less likely to act wilfully [sic] than the judge who either mistakes freedom for constraint or has no
compunctions about misrepresenting his will as that of the Congress.”).
105. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 990 (2016) (finding that “as
interpretive tools, purpose, legislative history, and intent appear no more susceptible to judicial
shaping to support competing interpretations than do textualist-favored tools such as the whole act
rule, dictionary definitions, and the plain meaning rule”).
106 . James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History:
Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 137–44 (2008)
(finding that liberal justices regularly invoked legislative history in favor of a pro-employer outcome);
see also CROSS, supra note 57, at 176 (finding that the invocation of textualist methods did not
influence the justices’ votes, once ideology is accounted for).
107. Krishnakumar, supra note 105, at 929.
108. See id. at 990.
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contingent and contestable.109
In brief, fair notice does not necessarily imply an equivalence between
legal and ordinary meaning. It does not require the legal significance or
consequence of statutory language to be determined solely by the sense it
bears in everyday discourse.
B.

Law, Morality, and Notice

The first challenge to the fair notice argument for textualism,
elaborated above, refutes the idea that fair notice necessitates giving
statutory text its ordinary meaning and precludes resort to legislative
history. But there is a second challenge arising from the insight that fair
notice operates against a background of normative expectations and
sensibilities. This background tempers the significance of express or
actual notice. Even in the absence of any signs or notices, people
comprehend that street benches may be freely used but not taken home.
And while the person who finds a diamond under a bush may not be
cognizant of the fine distinctions between property that is abandoned,
property that is lost, and property that is misplaced, they will at least pause
and wonder about their legal right to the precious stone.
The normative faculties are developed throughout a person’s
upbringing and education.110 Starting from an early age, children acquire
normative proficiency, learning first to heed instructions by controlling
their own desires and then to adopt the perspectives of themselves and
others.111 They also assimilate the normative expectations society has of
them, not by memorizing abstract rules, but by grasping how they should
behave in concrete situations. 112 This can occur through instruction,
observation, or trial and error.113 Because the learning process is accretive
and un-systematized, it may seem invisible and mysterious. As Jeremy
Bentham once exclaimed:
109. In addition, Meir Dan-Cohen argues that a statute could simultaneously be a conduct rule
addressed to citizens and a decision rule addressed to officials. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625
(1984). In this framework, it is not necessary—and may in fact be salutary—for learned
interpretations to diverge from lay understandings of the law. As Dan-Cohen puts it, “[t]he proper
relationship between decision rules and their corresponding conduct rules is not a logical or analytical
matter. Rather, it is a normative issue that must be decided in accordance with the relevant policies
and values.” Id. at 629. The rule of law ideal does not necessarily tell against acoustic separation
between conduct and decision rules, especially when decision rules are more lenient than the
corresponding conduct rules. Id. at 667–73.
110. Christoph Engel, Learning the Law, 4 J. INST. ECON. 275, 285 (2008).
111. Id. at 285–87.
112. See id. at 287–88.
113. See id.
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[H]ow a custom itself, is to be known, is a question, which upon
the supposition that it is the custom of the people in
general . . . seems neither very natural nor very material. How is
it to be known? meaning by the people? Why, they know it, by
the supposition; they even practise it, it is their custom. ‘How are
the people to know what it is they do themselves?’ God knows,
unless they know already. 114
Bentham was speaking of custom and not law. But obedience to posited
law is not all that different from adherence to inherited custom. Christoph
Engel argues, for example, that “developing normative proficiency is part
and parcel of development as such” and “[t]here is no separate legal
proficiency.”115 And for law to govern behavior, “it is irrelevant whether
the addressee knows the wording of the rule. . . . All she must know is
what she is expected to do in a concrete situation to which the legal rule
applies.”116 Such knowledge may be transmitted in the form of norms or
exemplars. 117 These simplifications help people conform to the law
without having to ponder it. A fully socialized citizen also comes to
appreciate the intimate connection between the legal and the moral—acts
that are immoral are often, though not always, illegal. 118 As the
nineteenth-century legal reformer John Austin observed, “some laws are
so obviously suggested by utility, that any person not insane would
naturally surmise or guess their existence . . . . They see that a particular
act would be mischievous, and they conclude that it must be
prohibited.”119 “[M]ost men’s knowledge of the law is mostly of this kind”
and outside of their fields of competence, “[e]ven lawyers have no other
knowledge than this.”120

114. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON
GOVERNMENT 192 (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977); see Jeremy Waldron, Custom Redeemed by
Statute, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 93, 110 (1998) (“In a purely customary regime, everyone
knows the rules, because in a sense their presence in the lives of ordinary people is all that there is
to their social reality.”).
115. Engel, supra note 110, at 287.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 287–88.
118. See FULLER, supra note 62, at 49–50 (“It would in fact be foolish to try to educate every
citizen into the full meaning of every law that might conceivably be applied to him . . . . The need for
this education will, of course, depend upon how far the requirements of law depart from generally
shared views of right and wrong.”); Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and
Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035, 1047 (2008) (arguing that “there is a necessary relation between the
scope of law and morality”).
119. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 485 (5th ed. 1885). For Austin, the principle
of utility is how people are to ascertain divine will where God has not revealed his command. Id. at
156–57.
120. Id. at 485.
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The fact that we can follow the law without studying it matters for how
fair notice is conceived. Our normative expectations and sensibilities may
furnish the warning required by legality.121 Or they might prompt us to
inquire further into the law’s demands. Consider the hypothetical posed
by the philosopher Robert Nozick:
[A] country’s constitutional laws require that at regular intervals
an official stamp must be placed on the document stating a law in
order to keep it in effect during the coming period. The clerk who
is to stamp the law against murder is sick or stuck in a traffic jam,
and the first other person to realize this goes out and commits a
murder during the three hours before another clerk gets around to
putting on the stamp. The murderer claims his act was not illegal
at the time, and so he should not be punished, that such
punishment would be under retroactive or ex post facto
legislation.122
This defense is hollow, and the case of the missing stamp shows that
“[t]here is no firm moral ban on retroactive punishment without actual
warning or legislation, for the crucial question is: did the person know or
should he have known he would be punished?”123
Nozick “find[s] that nonlawyers agree with this conclusion and
reasoning while law students do not.”124 But it seems that the criminal law
does acknowledge the embeddedness of fair notice in a matrix of norms,
values, orientations, and practices. Conduct that is malum in se, for
example, need not be declared wrong to be so.125 When an act or omission
is intrinsically wrongful, fair notice is either otiose or satisfied.126 It does
121 . Indeed, Roman law permitted “persons under twenty-five years, women, soldiers, and
peasants and other persons of small intelligence” to plead ignorance as a defense but only as to the
jus civile, the customs and laws of the city of Rome, and not as to the jus gentium which is knowable
by natural reason. Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV.
75, 80 (1908); see Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 671, 685 (1976).
122. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 391–92 (1981) (emphasis omitted).
123. Id. at 392.
124. Id.
125. BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at *54 (“[C]rimes and misdemeanors, that are forbidden by the
superior laws, and therefore styled mala in se . . . contract no additional turpitude from being declared
unlawful by the inferior legislature; for that legislature in all these cases acts only, as was before
observed, in subordination to the great Lawgiver, transcribing and publishing His precepts. So that,
upon the whole, the declaratory part of the municipal law has no force or operation at all with regard
to actions that are naturally and intrinsically right or wrong.”).
126. Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 901 (2005)
(“When the conduct the government seeks to prosecute is necessarily wrongful, the usual reasons
given for strictly construing criminal statutes—fair warning, separation of powers, and federalism—
will often be viewed as having considerably weakened force.”); REED DICKERSON, THE
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not lie in the offender’s mouth to plead want of notice. Thus, it was
opined, in the context of prosecutions under Article 134 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice for “conduct to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces” or “conduct of a nature to bring discredit
on the armed forces,” that
a servicemember must have or be given adequate notice that his
contemplated conduct is punishable. Notice may be shown in
different ways. If the act is malum in se, that is, it is inherently
wrongful and known to be so by anyone in our society, the notice
requirement is met. Common law offenses are of this nature as
are those crimes found in most of our penal codes. In the military
services, certain acts may be inherently wrongful and known to
be so by any reasonable servicemember due to their occurrence
in the military context, even though they are not prohibited in the
civilian sector.127
The court articulates a nexus between law and morality that serves to
provide notice when the text is otherwise silent. It also recognizes that the
normative background relevant to fair notice depends on the relevant
community. Behavior that is tolerated by society at large may be
especially pernicious in peculiar settings or environments—and
commonly known to be so.
The normative faculties do not only speak to the wisdom of a
contemplated action; they can also induce a person to hesitate and seek
advice.128 Some activities, while not wrongful in and of themselves, are
of the kind regulated by law because they impose significant or
unreciprocated risks on others. There is nothing sinister, for instance,
about operating a vehicle. Nevertheless, even visitors to a foreign land
know to check the applicable licensing scheme should they wish to drive.
Complaints that the legal rules were not advertised or too dense for a
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 211 (1975) (“A rule of strict interpretation or
application seems unjustified where the statute carries a strong probable meaning of criminality (even
though it may not be entirely free of doubt) or where an independent warning is unneeded (malum in
se).”).
127. United States v. Hester, 68 M.J. 618, 619–620 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2010) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting United States v. Henderson, 32 M.J. 941, 947 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Medina, No. ARMY 20040327, 2008 WL
8087940, at *4 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2008) (Holden, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(“Appellant admitted he engaged in one electronic shipment and at least two coerced productions of
child pornography in Vilseck, Germany. . . . No statute is necessary to advise any person that such
conduct is inherently wrong, violates the mores of any civilized society, and is therefore service
discrediting.”).
128. Cf. BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 77 (1993) (introducing “rules
of moral salience” which are “[a]cquired as elements in a moral education” and “enable [an agent] to
pick out those elements of his circumstances or of his proposed actions that require moral attention”).
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tourist to parse will hardly find a sympathetic ear. It is unsurprising
therefore that “public welfare offenses” which “depend on no mental
element but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions” are usually
created to “render[] criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person
should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community’s health or safety.” 129 Someone who takes
delivery of a hand grenade not registered to them should not be “surprised
to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.”130 In the
same vein, the “manifest purpose [of federal narcotics laws] is to require
every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which
he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute.”131 Neither ignorance
nor mistake is an excuse.132 By contrast, the acquisition of food stamps,
even at a price below face value, does not ring any moral alarm bells.133
“A food stamp can hardly be compared to a hand grenade,” nor is its
purchase on par with the sale of adulterated drugs.134 Indeed, offenses
criminalizing otherwise innocent behavior must incorporate an element of
scienter to survive due process scrutiny.135 Hence, a “convicted person”
who remained in Los Angeles for more than five days without registering
with the police could not be punished under the municipal code where
they “did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof
of the probability of such knowledge.” 136 “Were it otherwise, the evil
would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too fine to read
or in a language foreign to the community.”137
The proposition that normative understandings may constitute or
obviate notice, if true, qualifies the rule of law argument for privileging
ordinary meaning. When the mischiefs or dangers being addressed are
129. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 420, 432–33 (1985); cf. Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v.
United States, 511 U.S. 513, 522 (1994) (“Even statutes creating public welfare offenses generally
require proof that the defendant had knowledge of sufficient facts to alert him to the probability of
regulation of his potentially dangerous conduct.”). Considerations of fair notice bear on the
permissibility of defining criminal offenses that lack a scienter requirement, but they do not explain
or justify the creation of such offenses. Such offenses may be created to systematize how high-risk
conduct is evaluated and punished and to remove the state’s burden to prove intent in cases where the
consequences are themselves highly probative of fault. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses:
Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 421 (1993).
130. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971).
131. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922); see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
607 (1994).
132. Balint, 258 U.S. at 254.
133. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
134. Id.
135. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228–29 (1957).
136. Id. at 226, 229.
137. Id. at 230.
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obscure or when the law is especially punitive, fair notice could entail
circumscription of the interpretive terrain by semantic context.
Conversely, attention to policy context becomes less objectionable where
the mischief being suppressed or risk being controlled is familiar, and
where the sanction is proportionate to the harm inflicted or necessary for
the legislative scheme to function. Fair notice, on the conception sketched
here, does not always require statutory language to be construed according
to the “[pictures that] words . . . evoke in the common mind.”138
III. A SURVEY EXPERIMENT
How then do ordinary people judge fair notice in the law? Although lay
intuitions and attitudes do not settle fundamental debates about the nature
of fair notice, they are nevertheless germane to the sociological legitimacy
of the legal system. Law and its institutions will not command respect if
citizens feel or believe they have been denied fair warning about the kinds
of behavior the state penalizes or the sentences that await offenders.
Moreover, empirical facts about how legal outcomes and reasoning are
perceived loom to the fore when normative questions are intractable.139
Consider, for example, the burden imposed on citizens to educate
themselves about their legal rights and obligations. Presumably, the
burden cannot be too heavy, or law will lose the ability to guide even the
most assiduous of its subjects. But neither can it be zero, even in a society
that lives under the rule of law. In the absence of any principled a priori
basis for determining how much is too much, architects of legal doctrines
and institutions may have to fall back on popular conceptions of fair
notice.
A.

Experimental Design

To canvass public opinion about fair notice in statutory interpretation,
I conducted a survey on a representative probability sample of the United
States. Embedded in the survey was an experiment evaluating the twin
challenges to the fair notice argument for textualism. As part of the survey
experiment, respondents were asked to read a vignette adapted from a
casebook staple, Smith v. United States, 140 and to say whether the

138. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
139. For a warning about how empirical facts about human psychology might be abused by those
in power to manipulate individuals into believing they had a fair process when they did not, see Robert
J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 188–193 (2005).
140. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
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defendant in that case had fair notice of the law.141 The choice of Smith
was based on two desiderata. First, it involved the interpretation of a
criminal statute. It is thus the kind of case where the pull of the fair notice
is at its strongest. Second, previous research uncovered high levels of
agreement in favor of the defendant even when people were asked how
ordinary readers would understand the provision at issue in Smith.142 A
scenario revolving around Smith would in all probability elicit a sizable
number of negative judgments of fair notice.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) targets anyone who “during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a
firearm.”143 The law specifically prescribes a mandatory sentence of five
years upon conviction—thirty if the firearm so used or carried is a
“machinegun” or “is equipped with a . . . silencer.”144 The defendant in
the case, John Angus Smith, had traveled from Tennessee to Florida to
buy drugs for resale.145 While in Florida, he tried to barter his MAC-10
machine gun with its equipped silencer for two ounces of cocaine.146 The
transaction was not consummated because the other party was in fact a
law enforcement officer. 147 Smith was arrested and charged with drug
trafficking. The issue pertinent here was whether the proposed exchange
amounted to the “use[]” of a firearm within the meaning of
section 924(c)(1).148
The district court answered yes, and the United States Court of Appeals

141. The experiment thus takes an “[a]pplied” rather than an “[a]bstract” approach to ordinary
meaning. See Macleod, supra note 77, at 12. That is, the reader is provided both the facts and the
statutory language—rather than the facts or the statutory language alone—and asked if “the full extent
of the statutory language encompasses the facts at issue.” Id. at 13. As explained by Macleod, “what
seems to matter for purposes of notice . . . is what would happen in the following sort of situation: An
ordinary person (whether employer or employee) is contemplating some course of action (e.g., firing
someone) or event (e.g., getting fired) and consults the statutory provision at issue.” Id. at 69–70
(emphasis added). “An [a]pplied approach tracks that ordinary reader’s answer.” Id.
142 . Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior & Anup Malani, Policy Preferences and Legal
Interpretation, 1 J.L. & CTS. 115, 128 (2013). Farnsworth and coauthors found that asking people
how ordinary readers would understand the statutory language at issue generated answers that were
less correlated with respondents’ policy preferences than asking people how they themselves
understand the legal text. Id. at 127. Unlike other scenarios, however, the gun use scenario—based
on Smith—did not produce a two-way shift. Respondents who were pro-defendant as a matter of
policy did not convert to the government’s position when asked which reading of the law they thought
to be “a better fit to the ordinary meaning of the statute’s text.” Id. at 122, 125.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
144. Id. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1)(B)(i).
145. Smith, 508 U.S. at 225.
146. Id. at 225–26.
147. Id. at 226.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
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for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.149 Declaring that “the plain meaning of
the statute controls ‘unless the language is ambiguous or leads to absurd
results, in which case a court may consult the legislative history and
discern the true intent of Congress,’” the panel held that the trading of
guns for drugs was comprehended by section 924(c)(1)—”the trade not
only facilitates, but also becomes, an illegal drug transaction.” 150 In
reaching this outcome, the Eleventh Circuit split from the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Phelps. 151 In Phelps, the Ninth Circuit
discerned from the concededly “sparse” legislative history a
Congressional intent to target “persons who chose to carry a firearm as an
offensive weapon for a specific criminal act.” 152 When carried as a
commodity, a firearm was not used “in relation to” the drug offense.
The position embraced by the Eleventh Circuit prevailed in the
Supreme Court. Writing for a six-justice majority, Justice O’Connor
sought to discern the natural, common meaning of the word “use.” 153
Relying on dictionary definitions, she straightforwardly reasoned that
“[b]y attempting to trade his MAC-10 for the drugs, [Smith] ‘used’ or
‘employed’ it as an item of barter to obtain cocaine; he ‘derived service’
from it because it was going to bring him the very drugs he sought.”154
This reading of the statute also furthered legislative purpose because
Congress, in enacting the provision, “was no doubt aware that drugs and
guns are a dangerous combination.” 155 “[A] gun [that] is treated
momentarily as an item of commerce . . . can be converted
instantaneously from currency to cannon” when the need arises. 156
Authoring the dissent, Justice Scalia agreed that “[i]n the search for
statutory meaning, we give nontechnical words and phrases their ordinary
meaning.”157 But there is, he maintained, a “distinction between how a
word can be used and how it ordinarily is used.” 158 “To use an
instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose” which,
in the case of a firearm, is to use it as a weapon.159 But even if the issue
were not as clear-cut as Justice Scalia believed it to be, it was, at the very
149. United States v. Smith, 957 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992).
150. Id. at 836–37.
151. 877 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1989).
152. Id. at 30 (internal quotations marks omitted).
153. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1993).
154. Id. at 229.
155. Id. at 240.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (emphasis in original).
159. Id.
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least, “eminently debatable,” and the criminal defendant was entitled to
the benefit of the doubt.160
Building on this fact pattern and the statutory arguments it generated,
the experimental protocol implemented a 2×2×2 full factorial, betweensubjects, designed to test whether lay perceptions of fair notice are swayed
by policy as opposed to semantic justifications, judicial conformance to
or deviation from the law of interpretation, and the severity of the legal
consequences. The survey instrument began by narrating the story of the
fictitious Sammy DeVito, “a member of a drug trafficking ring operating
in the United States.”161 Respondents read that:
On the morning of 18 August 2014, Sammy drove from
Tennessee to Florida to procure some cocaine. While in Florida,
Sammy proposed to trade his gun—a modified MAC-10—for the
drug. The MAC-10 is valued by criminals because it is light,
compact, and has a high rate of fire. The exchange was supposed
to take place in a motel room. Unfortunately for Sammy, federal
law enforcement agents were tipped off to the transaction and
they arrested him after he entered the motel room carrying the
unloaded MAC-10 in a duffel bag.162
They were then asked how many years in prison Sammy should get for
his behavior. As respondents had not, at this stage, been introduced to the
statutory issue, their answers are indicative of how they assess the gravity
of the described conduct. Following this query, respondents were
informed that:
Sammy was eventually charged for conspiring and attempting to
possess cocaine for the purpose of distribution. He did not contest
these charges.
Sammy was also charged for “us[ing]” a firearm “during and in
relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime.” Title 18 of the United
States Code, Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a harsher punishment
for anyone who “uses” a firearm “during and in relation to
any . . . drug trafficking crime.” The term “uses” is not defined by
the statute.
The prosecutor argued that Sammy had violated
Section 924(c)(1). According to the prosecutor, Sammy “use[d]”
the MAC-10 by trying to exchange it for drugs. Sammy’s defense
attorney contended, on the other hand, that because the MAC-10
was brought to the motel room as a commodity, not a weapon, it
160. Id. at 246.
161. Benjamin Minhao Chen, Nat’l Op. Rsch. Ctr., Univ. of Chicago, Legal Decisions Experiment
Survey 6 (2020) [hereinafter Legal Decisions Survey] (on file with author).
162. Id.
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was not “use[d]” in the appropriate sense. Despite their
differences, both sides agreed that the MAC-10 was unloaded and
transported in a duffel bag.163
The following binary question was posed: “Based on what you have
been told so far, would you say that Sammy “‘use[d]’ a firearm by trading
the MAC-10 for cocaine?”164 At this point, respondents had little to go on
other than skeletal facts and the bare text of the statute. The ordinary
meaning of the provision is likely to factor into lay construals of the law.
But moral and political attitudes are also likely to have a bearing on how
people read the law, whether they know it or not.165 The positions favored
by respondents are thus best interpreted as expressions of their own policy
inclinations, bounded by the possibilities of statutory language. 166
Because respondents who did not believe Sammy “use[d]” a firearm
would be disposed to deny the existence of fair notice, they were the most
appropriate subjects for the present study.
After the two pre-treatment variables—beliefs about the egregiousness
of the described behavior and whether Section 924(c)(1) extends to gunfor-drug exchanges—had been recorded, respondents were randomized to
different experimental conditions. The additional, consecutive, sentence
for anyone who “uses” a firearm “during and in relation to any . . . drug
trafficking crime” was stated as thirty years for respondents in the
“heavier sentence” condition and five for those in the “lighter sentence”
condition.167 The governing law of interpretation was then set forth. Some
respondents learned that “[t]he law requires courts to prioritize the
ordinary or usual meaning of the statute in deciding whether it applies.”168

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Farnsworth et al., supra note 142; EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW
POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 161–64 (2009); see also Joshua Furgeson &
Linda Babcock, Legal Interpretation and Intuitions of Public Policy, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY,
AND LAW 684 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012). It may well be impossible to banish normative attitudes from
the interpretation of language, for human communication depends to some extent on shared
assumptions, values, and beliefs. DICKERSON, supra note 126, at 106; see PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN
THE WAY OF WORDS 25–31 (1991) (deriving maxims of conversational implicatures from the premise
that “talk exchanges . . . are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a
mutually accepted direction”). But sustained discussion of this claim lies beyond the scope of the
experiment.
166. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 480, 483 (1990) (“The
biasing role of goals is . . . constrained by one’s ability to construct a justification for the desired
conclusion: People will come to believe what they want to believe only to the extent that reason
permits.”).
167. Legal Decisions Survey, supra note 161, at 7.
168. Id.
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That is, “the plain or ordinary or usual meaning of the words or phrases
used in the statute should govern, even if it is contrary to the purpose for
which the statute was passed.” 169 Others were taught that “[t]he law
requires courts to prioritize the purpose of the statute in deciding whether
it applies.”170 That is, “the purpose for which the statute was passed should
govern, even if it is contrary to the ordinary or usual meaning of the words
or phrases used in the statute.”171
After being apprised of the controlling interpretative regime,
respondents were told how the case was decided based on whether they
were assigned to the “semantic” or “policy” justification:
The judge in this case focused on the [ordinary or usual meaning
/ purpose] of the statute. [Because the everyday meaning of “use”
is broad and expansive / Because Congress intended the meaning
of “use” to be broad and expansive], the court reasoned, a person
“uses” a firearm by trading it for drugs. In reaching this
conclusion, the judge relied on [definitions of “use” as “to
employ” or “to derive service from.” These definitions are
published in common dictionaries / floor speeches by
Congresspeople and Senators highlighting the dangers and risks
to life created whenever firearms are present in a drug transaction.
These statements are published in the Congressional Record].172
Respondents belonged to the “conforms to doctrine” condition if the
way the case was resolved was consonant with the law of interpretation
as explained to them, and to the “deviates from doctrine” condition
otherwise. The vignette concluded by informing the reader that “Sammy
was ultimately sentenced to [fifteen / forty] years in federal prison; ten
years for conspiring and attempting to possess cocaine for the purpose of
distribution and [five / thirty] years for the “use[]” of a firearm.”173 Those
allocated to the “lighter sentence” condition found out that Sammy was
sentenced to fifteen years in total, five for the “use[] of a firearm” as
compared to forty and thirty years respectively for those allocated to the
“heavier sentence” condition.
After finishing the vignette, respondents were asked whether they
“believe[d] that Sammy had fair warning of the additional sentence
imposed for exchanging a firearm, rather than money or some other good,
for drugs.” 174 This is the main outcome variable of the experiment.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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Respondents were also polled for their guesses about Sammy’s actual
knowledge of the law penalizing the “‘use[]’ of firearms in drug
trafficking”175 and solicited for their opinions about the accessibility of a
dictionary and the Congressional Record to Sammy. 176 Manipulation
checks were performed near the end of the survey instrument. These
checks verified that the manipulations were processed by respondents. A
final item captured self-reported political ideology on a one to seven scale,
one being “extremely liberal,” four being “moderate,” and seven being
“extremely conservative.”177
In a nutshell, the survey experiment featured a 2×2×2 full factorial,
between-subjects design (Figure 1). Respondents were randomized to one
of two interpretive regime conditions (“textualist” or “purposivist”), one
of two severity of punishment conditions (“lighter sentence” or “heavier
sentence”) and one of two justification conditions (“semantic” or
“policy”). 178 They were classified as being in the “conforms to the
doctrine” condition if they were assigned to a “textualist” interpretive
regime and a “semantic” justification or a “purposivist” interpretive
regime and a “policy” justification. They were classified as being in the
“deviates from doctrine” condition if they were assigned to a “textualist”
interpretive regime and a “policy” justification or a “purposivist”
interpretive regime and a “semantic” justification. The information
respondents received varied based on the conditions they were sorted to.
Respondents were then asked whether they “believe[d] that Sammy had
fair warning of the additional sentence imposed for exchanging a firearm,
rather than money or some other good, for drugs.”179

175. Id. at 8.
176. Id. at 8–9. The exact phrasing of the accessibility questions was “In your opinion, how easy
would it have been for Sammy to look up the definition of a statutory term in an English dictionary?”
and “In your opinion, how easy would it have been for Sammy to look up the legislative debates
surrounding the statute in the Congressional Record?” Id. Respondents randomized to the “semantic”
justification were posed the former question before the latter and vice versa for respondents
randomized to the “policy” justification.
177. Id. at 10.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Id. at 7.

Chen (Do Not Delete)

2022]

6/21/22 10:26 AM

TEXTUALISM AS FAIR NOTICE?

371

Figure 1: 2×2×2 full factorial, between-subjects, design of the survey
experiment based on Smith v. United States.

B.

Sample and Results

The survey was fielded in May 2020 to a representative panel of adults
in the United States by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at
the University of Chicago. NORC’s AmeriSpeak panel is qualitatively
different from subjects recruited from online platforms such as Amazon
Mechanical Turk or by companies such as Prolific or Toluna, even when
samples are constructed to match the demographic profile of the target
population. This is because participants in the AmeriSpeak panel are
randomly drawn from a sampling frame that covers the adult population
of the United States.180 Because every household in the NORC National
180. As described by NORC, to build the AmeriSpeak panel,
[r]andomly selected US households are sampled using area probability and address-based
sampling, with a known, non-zero probability of selection from the NORC National Sample
Frame. These sampled households are then contacted by US mail, telephone, and field
interviewers (face to face). The panel provides sample coverage of approximately 97% of the
U.S. household population. Those excluded from the sample include people with P.O. Box only
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Sample Frame has a non-zero chance of being invited to participate, the
problems of self-selection and non-naivete that might plague convenience
pools are mitigated.181 In addition, because the 2021 respondents for this
survey constitute a probability sample of the adult population of the
United States, there is a statistical foundation for making population
inferences from sample data. Study-specific base sampling weights that
account for the probability of selection from the sampling frame and nonresponse, among other things, are available. Unless otherwise stated,
however, analysis is performed on the unweighted data.182
1.

Descriptive and Correlational Results

Like the Supreme Court, respondents split on whether Sammy had
“‘use[d]’ a firearm by trading the MAC-10 for cocaine.” A majority of
respondents, however, sided with Sammy: 1236 would not say that
Sammy “use[d]” a firearm, 781 would say he did, and 4 skipped. Applying
the base sampling weights, the sample data imply that 40.4% of the
population would hold that Sammy had “use[d]” a firearm; 183 59.2%
would not.184 Unsurprisingly, compared to respondents who opined that
Sammy “use[d]” a firearm, respondents who opined he did not were much
more inclined to say that he was not given fair warning of the penalty
imposed on gun for drug transactions. 78.2% of respondents in the former
category thought fair notice had been given against 31.3% in the latter
category.
addresses, some addresses not listed in the USPS Delivery Sequence File, and some newly
constructed dwellings. While most AmeriSpeak households participate in surveys by web, noninternet households can participate in AmeriSpeak surveys by telephone. Households without
conventional internet access but having web access via smartphones are allowed to participate
in AmeriSpeak surveys by web.
Project Statement from J. Michael Dennis, Nat’l Op. Res. Ctr., to Benjamin Chen, Nat’l Univ. of
Singapore 8 (Mar. 25, 2020) (on file with author).
181. David J. Hauser, Gabriele Paolacci & Jesse Chandler, Common Concerns with MTurk as a
Participant Pool: Evidence and Solutions, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN CONSUMER
PSYCHOLOGY 319, 324–25, 330–31 (Frank R. Kardes, Paul M. Herr & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2019).
182. Employing weights in the analysis of survey experiments increases the certainty of estimates
for population average treatment effects but decreases the power of estimates for sample average
treatment effects. Luke W. Miratrix, Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Alexander G. Theodoridis & Luis F. Campos,
Worth Weighting? How to Think About and Use Weights in Survey Experiments, 26 POL. ANALYSIS
275, 289 (2018). Weights are eschewed here because there is unlikely to be too much of a discrepancy
between sample and population average treatment effects given that the unweighted sample data is
largely representative of the overall population. See id. at 288.
183. The standard error on this estimate is 1.5% and the 95% confidence interval is between 37.5%
and 43.4%. 95% confidence intervals include the true parameter value ninety-five times out of a
hundred realizations of the sample data.
184. The standard error on this estimate is 1.5% and the 95% confidence interval is between 56.2%
and 62.1%.
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Respondents’ judgments of fair notice and their interpretations of
Section 924(c)(1)—collected at the start of the instrument—were also
positively correlated with self-reported ideology as measured on a sevenpoint scale. 185 It is highly improbable that these correlations are the
product of chance.186
2.

Analysis of Experiment

After reading the entire vignette, 993 respondents held that “Sammy
had fair warning of the additional sentence imposed for exchanging a
firearm, rather than money or some other good, for drugs” while 1016 did
not (Table 1).
Yes, Sammy had fair
warning

No, Sammy did not
have fair warning

Skipped

Yes, Sammy “use[d]” a
firearm

606

169

6

No, Sammy did not
“use[]” a firearm

385

845

6

Skipped

2

2

0

Table 1: Cross-tabulation of all subjects’ interpretations of section 924(c)(1)
and judgments of fair notice.

The remainder of the analysis will be confined to respondents who did
not think that section 924(c)(1) extended to Sammy’s conduct, omitting
non-responses. Descriptively, these respondents’ opinions about how the
law ought to punish conduct like Sammy’s varied widely, with sentences
ranging from one year to thirty-three years. The median response was ten
years. For our purposes, it suffices to note that 841 respondents thought
that Sammy’s conduct should attract a penalty of no greater than fifteen
years, 395 respondents thought it should attract a penalty of more than
fifteen but no greater than forty years, and no one thought it should attract
a penalty of more than forty years in prison. It is thus safe to presume that
a total sentence of forty years was seen by these respondents as
numerically and substantively heavier than a total sentence of fifteen

185 . Recall that one on the scale is “Extremely liberal,” four is “Moderate,” and seven is
“Extremely conservative.” Legal Decisions Survey, supra note 161, at 10.
186. Kendall’s τ coefficient is 0.120 (p=0.000) for the relationship between judgments of fair notice
and self-reported ideology and 0.065 (p=0.001) for the relationship between interpretations of
section 924(c)(1) and self-reported ideology.
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years.

Figure 2: Judgments of fair notice among the 1230 subjects who would not
say that Sammy “use[d]” a firearm, grouped by severity of punishment. Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals.

As it turns out, the severity of the punishment had a noticeable effect
on lay judgments of fair notice (Figure 2). When subjects were told that
the sentence prescribed by law for the “use[] of a firearm” was five years
in prison, 37.2% thought Sammy was fairly warned. The same figure
stands at 25.8% for subjects who were told that the sentence was thirty
years, a statistically significant drop of 11.4 percentage points (p=0.000,
two-sided t-test).
Is the influence of sentence length on lay judgments of fair notice a
function of how severely subjects would have the law punish the
defendant? The answer seems to be no. Judgments of fair notice are coded
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as one if they are positive and zero if they are negative. An ordinary least
squares regression of judgments of fair notice on the severity of the
punishment, the sentence subjects proposed, measured in years, and the
interaction between the two variables does not pick up any heterogeneity
between those who were harsh and those who were lenient (Table 2).187
The coefficient on the interaction term is very close to zero and not
statistically significant (0.002, p=0.846). Whether subjects thought
Sammy had fair notice does not appear to depend on their own views of
his drug trafficking activities.

Judgment of Fair Notice
Constant

0.372***
(0.020)

Heavier sentence

-0.114***
(0.026)

Sentence proposed by subject

-0.001
(0.002)

Heavier sentence:
Sentence proposed by subject

0.002
(0.003)

Observations

1230

2

R

0.016

Adjusted R2

0.013

Note:

*

p<0.05

**

p<0.01

***

p<0.001

Table 2: Estimated coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of
binary judgments of fair notice on an indicator variable for the severity of the
punishment, a continuous variable for the sentence proposed by subjects, and the
interaction of both variables. Judgments of fair notice are coded as one if they
are positive and zero if they are negative. The reference category for severity of
punishment is “lighter sentence.” The sentence proposed by subjects is measured
in years and centered. Observations are limited to subjects who would not say
that Sammy “use[d]” a firearm. Robust standard errors are computed using the

187. The sentences proposed by subjects are centered by subtracting the mean from individual
observations. Robust standard errors are computed using the HC2 sandwich estimator. Cf. Winston
Lin, Agnostic Notes on Regression Adjustments to Experimental Data: Reexamining Freedman’s
Critique, 7 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 295, 296 (2013).
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HC2 sandwich estimator.

In contrast to the severity of the punishment, the justification relied on
by the court had no discernable effect on how subjects evaluated fair
notice (Figure 3). When the court relied on dictionary definitions to hold
that the term “use” had a broad and expansive meaning, 31.8% of subjects
opined that fair notice had been given. When the court relied on
legislator’s floor speeches to hold that Congress intended the term “use”
to have a broad and expansive meaning, 30.8% expressed the same
opinion—a statistically insignificant decrease (p=0.695, two-sided t test).

Figure 3: Judgments of fair notice among the 1230 subjects who would not say
that Sammy “use[d]” a firearm, grouped by justification. Error bars show 95%
confidence intervals.

The political tenor of the statutory interpretation debate hints that
ideology ought to matter; conservative subjects should be more amenable
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to a semantic justification and liberal subjects to a policy justification. One
might imagine, for instance, that conservative subjects who construed the
provision narrowly at first would take exception to judicial reasoning
grounded in legislative history or statutory purpose. But no such patterns
are revealed by the data. Judgments of fair notice are coded as one if they
are positive and zero if they are negative. They are then regressed on the
justification for the decision, ideology, measured on a seven-point scale,
and the interaction between the two variables (Table 5).188 Overall, more
conservative subjects were inclined to say there was fair warning while
more liberal subjects were disposed to say there was not. This correlation
is statistically significant (0.037, p=0.001). But the policy justification did
not produce differing reactions in conservative as compared to liberal
subjects. The estimated coefficient on the interaction between policy
justification and ideology is close to zero and statistically insignificant (0.004, p=0.785).

Judgment of Fair Notice
Constant

0.319***
(0.019)

Policy justification

-0.011
(0.026)

Ideology

0.037***
(0.011)

Policy justification:
Ideology

-0.004
(0.016)

Observations

1222

R2

0.015

Adjusted R2

0.012

Note:

*

p<0.05

**

p<0.01

***

p<0.001

Table 3: Estimated coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of
binary judgments of fair notice on an indicator variable for justification, a
continuous variable for ideology, and the interaction of both variables.
Judgments of fair notice are coded as one if they are positive and zero if they are

188. Ideology scores are centered by subtracting the mean from individual observations. Robust
standard errors are computed using the HC2 sandwich estimator.
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negative. The reference category for justification is “semantic justification.”
Ideology is measured on a one to seven scale, one being “Extremely liberal,”
four being “Moderate,” and seven being “Extremely conservative.” The ideology
variable is centered. Observations are limited to subjects who would not say that
Sammy “use[d]” a firearm. Robust standard errors are computed using the HC2
sandwich estimator.

Are the null results attributable to the inattentiveness of respondents
rather than ambivalence as to how the decision was justified? The data
indicate they are not. The same pattern obtains even when attention is
restricted to the 691 subjects who correctly recalled the justification given
by the court.

Figure 4: Judgments of fair notice among the 1230 subjects who would not say
that Sammy “use[d]” a firearm, grouped by conformity to doctrine. Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals.
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Moreover, the judge’s conformance to or deviation from the controlling
doctrine of interpretation did not have a discernible effect on whether
subjects believed Sammy to have been fairly warned (Figure 4). 32.6% of
subjects found fair notice when the judge conformed to the prevailing
interpretive regime compared to 29.9% when the judge deviated. 189 This
difference is not statistically significant (p=0.307, two-sided t-test).
Given the length and complexity of the scenario, there may be reason
to doubt whether all subjects were alert to the disparity between the stated
law of interpretation and the court’s interpretive method. The
manipulation checks were multiple-choice questions presenting four
mutually exclusive options. If all subjects guessed at random between
these options, then approximately 77 out of 1230 of them could be
expected to pass the two manipulation checks applicable here. In fact, 317
of them correctly remembered the justification given by the court and the
prevailing law of interpretation. Though higher than would be produced
by chance alone, this number is barely more than a quarter of the subjects
included in the preceding analysis. Still, conformance to or deviation from
the law of interpretation did not appear to impact the judgments of these
317 subjects (-0.001; p=0.977, two-sided t-test).190
Does the approach mandated by the law of interpretation influence how
ordinary people evaluate judicial departures from legal orthodoxy? It
seems, for example, that focusing on textual cues is acceptable even when
the governing paradigm is to further legislative purpose. After all, “the
best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.”191 On the other
hand, emphasis on policy objectives not apparent on the face of the law
might be exceptionable when the prevailing rule is to give statutory
language the meaning it has in everyday discourse.

189. The standard error is 2.6% and the 95% confidence interval is between -7.9% and 2.5%.
190. The standard error is 0.052 and the 95% confidence interval is between -0.104 and 0.101.
191. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.); see W. Va.
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (Scalia, J.).
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Figure 5: Judgments of fair notice among the 1230 subjects who would not say that
Sammy “use[d]” a firearm, grouped by conformity to doctrine and interpretive regime.
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.

To explore these possibilities, subjects are divided along two
dimensions. First, whether they were informed that “[t]he law requires
courts to prioritize the ordinary or usual meaning of the statute in deciding
whether it applies” or that “[t]he law requires courts to prioritize the
purpose of the statute in deciding whether it applies.”192 Second, whether
the judge conformed to or deviated from the law of interpretation. The
192. Recall that the explanations given to respondents are that “the plain or ordinary or usual
meaning of the words or phrases used in the statute should govern, even if it is contrary to the purpose
for which the statute was passed” or that “the purpose for which the statute was passed should govern,
even if it is contrary to the ordinary or usual meaning of the words or phrases used in the statute,” as
the case may be. Legal Decisions Survey, supra note 161, at 7.
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percentage of subjects in each group who thought Sammy was fairly
warned is computed for all respondents who would not say that Sammy
“use[d]” a firearm (Figure 5). While deviation from the law of
interpretation generated lower average judgments of fair notice for
subjects randomly assigned to both textualist (p=0.279, two-sided t-test)
and purposivist (p=0.712, two-sided t-test) regimes, this fluctuation could
very well be due to sampling chance rather than systematic difference. In
addition, judicial invocation of legislative history and intent resulted in
higher average judgments of fair notice—34.1% compared to 27.1%—
when the law required courts to prioritize the purpose rather than the
ordinary or usual meaning of the statute. 193 This rise is just shy of
conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.058, two-sided t-test).
It should also be noted that privileging semantic context under a textualist
regime did not engender proportionately more judgments of fair notice
than elevating policy context under a purposivist regime. To be sure, the
3.1 percentage point gap between the two groups is not statistically
significant (p=0.395, two-sided t-test).194 But it cuts against the notion that
elevating unenacted purpose over enacted text is ipso facto unfair, even as
to a criminal defendant. Narrowing the subject pool to those who passed
all relevant manipulation checks does not alter the qualitative conclusions,
except that adherence to doctrine under a purposivist rather than textualist
regime produced greater average judgments of fair notice to an extent that
is statistically significant.195
3.

Summing Up

In sum, 31.3% of subjects who would not say that Sammy “use[d]” a
firearm within the meaning of Section 924(c)(1) nevertheless believed he
had fair notice of the punishment. This percentage, however, varied
depending on the severity of the punishment. When the offense carried a
penalty of five years in prison, 37.2% of subjects thought fair warning had
been given. When it carried a penalty of thirty years, only 25.8% thought
the same. However, the justification offered by the court, whether
grounded in semantic or policy considerations, did not influence subjects.
Neither did adherence to or departure from the binding interpretive
193. The standard error is 7.8% and the 95% confidence interval is between -14.3% and 0.2%.
194. The standard error is 3.7% and the 95% confidence interval is between -10.3% and 4.1%.
195. As the number of subjects in each group might be too small for the central limit theorem or
the normal approximation to the binomial distribution to hold, comparisons are made using
Boschloo’s test. A form of randomization inference, Boschloo’s test does not rely on assumptions
about the underlying distribution of the true parameter and is by construction uniformly more
powerful than Fisher’s exact test. R.D. Boschloo, Raised Conditional Level of Significance for the
2x2-Table When Testing the Equality of Two Probabilities, 24 STATISTICA NEERLANDICA 1 (1970).
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regime. The data do suggest that judicial reliance on legislative history
and purpose was perceived as being fairer or at least equally fair under a
purposivist rather than textualist regime. In any case, reliance on a policy
justification under a purposivist regime did not appear to provoke more
complaints of unfair surprise than reliance on semantic justification under
a textualist regime.
Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge some limitations. All research
methods have their weaknesses and strengths, and survey experiments are
no exception. The randomization of subjects to different conditions
establishes internal validity. 196 It is sound to infer that the differences
observed between groups were caused by purposeful manipulations in the
vignette. But subjects’ answers to the survey do not always mirror how
they might react to a case they hear about on the news or how they might
feel if they were the defendant in the case. The generalizability of the
survey experiment to more natural environments—external validity—
cannot be taken for granted.197 Moreover, the survey addressed a single
controversy: Smith. Although Smith is precisely the kind of case that
triggers fair warning concerns, it may be worthwhile to replicate the
experiment in other legal and, perhaps, non-criminal settings.
IV. VINDICATING FAIR NOTICE
The results of the survey experiment show that appeals to ordinary
meaning and dictionary definitions are not perceived as being intrinsically
fairer than recourse to statutory purpose and legislative history. More
palpably, lay judgments of fair notice are shaped not only by the character
of the proscribed behavior but also by the severity of the punishment
meted out. What do the empirical findings imply for the fair notice
argument for textualism?
A.

Substance and Procedure

First, substantive outcomes seem to matter more than choice of
interpretive approach for lay perceptions of fair notice. Consensus or
uniformity of legal method does not necessarily promote fair notice and

196. WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, EXPERIMENTAL AND
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 53 (2002) (describing
internal validity as referring to “inferences about whether observed covariation between A and B
reflects a causal relationship from A to B in the form in which the variables were manipulated or
measured”).
197. Id. at 38 (describing external validity as “the validity of inferences about whether the causal
relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables, and measurement
variables”).
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might even impair it.
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks famously lamented that “American courts
have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory
of statutory interpretation.” 198 This unsatisfactory state of affairs has
inspired numerous proposals for bringing order and uniformity to the
domain of statutory interpretation. In describing law as the product of
collaboration and contestation between rational institutional actors,
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey extol the advantages of a normative
schema that “tells lower court judges, agencies, and citizens how strings
of words in statutes will be read, what presumptions will be entertained as
to statutes’s scope and meaning, and what auxiliary materials might be
consulted to resolve ambiguities.”199 Such an interpretive regime, they
explain, not only promotes the rule of law but also facilitates coordination
between the legislative and judicial branches of government.200 In this
regard, the canons of construction—rules and maxims that guide the
judicial reading of statutes—“may be understood as conventions, similar
to driving a car on the right-hand side of the road; often it is not as
important to choose the best convention as it is to choose one convention,
and stick to it.”201 Nicholas Rosenkranz has drawn on similar arguments
in proposing that Congress enact the Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation.202 Like Eskridge and Frickey, Rosenkranz considers that
“[i]n most cases, the particular choice of rule will be less important than
that some clear rule be chosen.”203 Selecting a rule and sticking to it has
the “[uncontroversial] theoretical merits” of “provid[ing] a rule-of-law
boon to the public, while lowering the costs of drafting statutes to the
legislature.” 204 According to Rosenkranz, Congress has both the
198. HART & SACKS, supra note 28, at 1169 (“The hard truth of the matter is that American courts
have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”);
see also SCALIA, supra note 20, at 14 (“The state of the science of statutory interpretation in American
law is accurately described by [Henry Hart and Albert Sacks] . . . .”); KENT GREENAWALT,
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 43 (2013) (“The often quoted comment of Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks . . . remains true for our federal courts.”); Charles Fried, Five to Four:
Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 181 (2002) (“[I]n cases turning on
the construction of statutes there may be agreement about a particular interpretation of a particular
statute, but a more enduring disagreement about the general method for interpreting statutes—for
example, about the use of legislative history.”).
199. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term—Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66 (1994).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 67.
202. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085 (2002).
203. Id. at 2157.
204. Id. at 2142.
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constitutional authority and the institutional capacity to develop an
interpretive regime for federal statutes. 205 Besides urging legislative
intervention, legal scholars have also turned to the venerable doctrine of
precedent for a solution. Why is it, Sydney Foster asks, that judges are
criticized for not acquiescing in prior resolutions of substantive legal
questions but not for persisting in their own idiosyncratic philosophies of
statutory interpretation? Contending that stare decisis advances the rule of
law and the legitimacy of courts, Foster calls for lower courts to be bound
by the pronouncements of higher courts on questions of interpretive
methodology.206 And the Supreme Court, Foster submits, ought normally
to abide by its own precedents on the subject matter.207
Resisting these novelties, Evan Criddle and Glen Staszewski argue that
freezing an interpretive regime in time may confound the expectations of
past legislatures and frustrate the preferences of future ones. 208 In
addition, flexibility may be a virtue in statutory interpretation. The
continuing vitality of a range of interpretive approaches and resources
enables courts to reach normatively desirable outcomes in individual
cases and “make[s] our legal system more responsive.”209 To the point
that uncertainty might defeat reliance interests, Criddle and Staszewski
note, first, that the federal courts have never declared themselves bound
by precedent on how they undertake the reading of law. Hence, to the
extent that legal actors and subjects have relied on judicial expositions of
statutory interpretive theory, such reliance is baseless. Moreover, “most
people . . . place much greater value on substance than procedure.” 210
Ultimately, “[t]o the extent that private citizens or public officials could
legitimately rely on judicial consideration of certain information, such as
the plain meaning of the text or the reasoned views of administrative
agencies, those expectations tend to be reflected in existing legal
doctrine.” 211 The traditional rationales for stare decisis are hence less
persuasive when it comes to interpretive methodology rather than
205. Id. at 2102–38, 2143–47.
206. Foster, supra note 96, at 1869.
207. Id. at 1884.
208. Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 96, at 1581–87.
209 . Id. at 1594; see Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory
Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 49 (2010) (“Interpretive diversity makes each judge work
hard to find compromises, render the strongest argument utilizing all credible sources available, and
take seriously all types of arguments to achieve the best result within the range of permissible
interpretations.”).
210. Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 96, at 1594; see also Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency
Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1811 (2010).
211. Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 96, at 1594.
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substantive law.212
The empirical findings of this Article inform this debate in two ways.
Assuming legislatures or the courts were to establish uniform rules for
construing statutes, the lay notions of fair warning tested here do not
arbitrate between textualism and purposivism. Conditional on outcome, a
textualist justification fared no better than a purposivist one. The
experimental results thus tell against the seductive intuition that fidelity
to text promotes fair notice while veneration of purpose diminishes it. In
the eyes of the populace, judicial reliance on extratextual indicia of
statutory meaning does not offend fair notice, especially if the law
expressly instructs courts to do so. Viewed from this perspective, the
choice of an interpretive regime may indeed be less important than simply
having one. At the same time, however, the experimental data corroborate
the not-infrequent assertion that ordinary people care less about abstract
rules of interpretation and more about concrete outcomes. In contrast to
the severity of the punishment imposed, judicial deviation from the
governing interpretive regime had no perceptible impact on lay judgments
of fair warning. It seems then that neither the Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation nor stare decisis in the realm of statutory interpretation will
enhance the rule of law value of fair notice—at least in the public eye.
Indeed, the opposite could be the result if judges would otherwise exercise
their latitude in ways that cohere with popular beliefs, attitudes, and
expectations.
B.

The Rule of Strict Construction Redux

Second, lay perceptions of fair notice are influenced by the severity of
the punishment contemplated by the law. To the extent that the rule of
lenity is grounded in fair notice,213 its application should be sensitive to
the legal consequences prescribed by the statute in question and not just
the statute’s ordinary meaning.
It is a rule, “almost as old as the common law itself,” that penal statutes
are to be construed strictly. 214 Writing in 1765, William Blackstone
explicated this principle by recounting that:
the statute 1 Edw. VI., c. 12, having enacted that those who are
convicted of stealing horses should not have the benefit of clergy,

212. Id.
213. See Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1082 (2022) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (“Lenity works to enforce the fair notice requirement by ensuring that an individual’s
liberty always prevails over ambiguous laws.”).
214. SCALIA, supra note 20, at 29; see also United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95
(1820) (Marshall, C.J.).
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the judges conceived that this did not extend to him that should
steal but one horse, and therefore procured a new act for that
purpose in the following year.215
There is a literal—if not moral—difference between stealing a horse
and stealing horses, and fair notice militates against reading the plural to
include the singular.216 Interpretations like the one described, which may
be “stigmatized as automatic[,] have resulted from the conviction that it
is fairer in a criminal statute to take a meaning which would jump to the
mind of the ordinary man at the cost even of defeating other values.”217
On a contemporary formulation, the rule of lenity instructs that
“[a]mbiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be
resolved in the defendant’s favor.”218 The rule does not, of course, compel
judges to give statutory language a crimped or unnatural reading.219 Only
when “after all the legitimate tools of interpretation have been applied, ‘a
reasonable doubt persists,’” does the criminal defendant win. 220 Lenity
has been characterized as “a tie-breaking principle, of relevance when
‘two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative
equipoise.’”221 It has also been described as a clear statement rule—“when
choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress
has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher
alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that
is clear and definite.”222
The modern rule of lenity has evolved from its historical roots in two
215. BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at *88 (emphasis omitted).
216. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 130; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __, 138
S. Ct. 1204, 1225 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Note that
the United States Code provides that “words importing the plural include the singular.” 1 U.S.C. § 1.
217. Hart, supra note 1, at 611.
218. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 296; see also Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 82, at 858.
This rule is justified on both fair notice and separation of powers grounds. See United States v. Santos,
553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
219. See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 361 (2016) (“But the arguable availability
of multiple, divergent principles of statutory construction cannot automatically trigger the rule of
lenity.”); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25–26 (1948) (“The canon in favor of strict
construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose.
It does not require magnified emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give it a meaning
contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining language.”).
220. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 299 (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103,
108 (1990)).
221. Lexin v. Superior Ct., 222 P.3d 214, 249 n.30 (Cal. 2010) (quoting Burris v. Superior Ct., 103
P.3d 276, 282 (Cal. 2005)); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 713 n.13 (2000); see also
Lockhart, 577 U.S. at 361 (“[T]he arguable availability of multiple, divergent principles of statutory
construction cannot automatically trigger the rule of lenity.”).
222. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952)).
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respects. First, lenity does not intervene to preclude the consideration of
legislative history and statutory purpose. In the nascent years of the
doctrine, “[c]ourts interpreted criminal statutes narrowly . . . but to the
extent that the dispute was over the meaning of a statutory word, limited
investigation occurred into the legislature’s intended meaning of that
word.” 223 For example, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Wiltberger 224 that there was no federal jurisdiction over a homicide
perpetrated on an American merchant vessel lying in the River Tigris in
China where the statute only punished manslaughter “on the high seas.”225
The law provided elsewhere for federal jurisdiction over murders
committed “upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay.”226
Though it was improbable that Congress meant to punish the one crime
when it occurred on certain bodies of water but not the other,
“probability,” Chief Justice Marshall cautioned, “is not a guide which a
court, in construing a penal statute, can safely take.”227
But as American courts started consulting legislative history and other
extratextual materials to expound statutes, lenity was relegated to a lesser
role, entering the fray only after all indicia of meaning had been exhausted
and found wanting.228 Thus, in Callanan v. United States, 229 a divided
Supreme Court held that consecutive sentences could be imposed for the
substantive crime of obstructing commerce by extortion and conspiracy
to commit the same, even though the statute outlawed both offenses in the
same breath, prescribing “[a] fine[] [of] not more than $10,000 or
imprison[ment] of not more than twenty years, or both.”230 Although the
dissent thought the statute could, “as a matter of English
language[,] . . . fairly be read as imposing a single penalty for each
interference or threatened interference with interstate commerce by any
or all of the prohibited means,” the majority rebuffed the application of
the rule of lenity.231 Per Justice Frankfurter, the rule “only serves as an aid
for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.”232 It “comes
into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has
expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being
223. Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 96 (1998).
224. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
225. Id. at 103.
226. Id. at 99.
227. Id. at 105.
228. Solan, supra note 223, at 107.
229. 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
230. Id. at 588 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1948)); id. at 597.
231. Id. at 601 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 596 (Frankfurter, J.).
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lenient to wrongdoers.”233 In recent times, Justice Scalia wrestled mightily
to return the courts to their former practice. 234 For him, “[w]here it is
doubtful whether the text includes the penalty, the penalty ought not be
imposed.”235 To resolve any misgivings by looking beyond the statutory
language to extraneous sources undermines the fair notice rationale of the
rule. But the dominant paradigm is still to consign lenity to a rule of “last
resort,”236 “reserved . . . for those situations in which a reasonable doubt
persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to ‘the language
and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the
statute.”237
The modern rule of lenity also diverges from the old rule of strict
construction in giving no formal consideration to the harshness of the law.
One nineteenth-century treatise on statutory interpretation explained that
it is “essential to [the] justice and humanity [of the penal law] that it be
expressed in language [all] can easily comprehend; that it be held
obligatory only in the sense in which all can and will understand
it[,] . . . this consideration press[ing] with increasing weight according to
the severity of the penalty.” 238 Another similarly recited that “statutes
which subject one to a punishment or penalty . . . are to be construed
strictly. . . . [T]he degree of strictness will depend somewhat on the
severity of the punishment they inflict.”239 Thus, the 1810 case of The
Enterprise240 held that a vessel and its cargo were not forfeit even though
the ship had been loaded in contravention of an act providing that:
no ship or vessel of the character of the Enterprise shall receive a
clearance, unless the lading shall be made under the inspection of
the proper revenue officers, subject to the same restrictions,
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 515 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (stating that application
of the rule of lenity cannot be avoided by speculative guesses about legislative intent).
235. United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (Scalia, J., concurring).
236. United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2351 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
237. R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 305–06 (emphasis in original) (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S.
103, 108 (1990)); see also Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (“[T]he rule of lenity only
applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a ‘grievous ambiguity
or uncertainty in the statute.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 429 (2009);
Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013); Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014);
Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1075 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“In
short, because a court must exhaust all the tools of statutory interpretation before resorting to the rule
of lenity, and because a court that does so often determines the best reading of the statute, the rule of
lenity rarely if ever comes into play.”).
238. J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 349, at 438 (1891).
239. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES § 193, at 186
(2d ed. 1883).
240. 8 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810).
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regulations, penalties, and forfeitures, as are provided by law for
the inspection of merchandise imported into the United States,
upon which duties are imposed, any law to the contrary
notwithstanding.241
“When the sense of a penal statute is obvious,” Circuit Justice
Livingston expounded, “consequences are to be disregarded; but if
doubtful, they are to have their weight in its interpretation.” 242 It was
murky whether clearances were to be withheld for the covert loading of a
ship or whether the act also contemplated more punitive measures, set
forth elsewhere. The incertitude “produced by the unusual and not very
luminous phraseology of th[e] section, [wa]s greatly increased by a
consideration of the very heavy and disproportionate punishment which
w[ould] follow” if the statute were given the import urged by the
government.243 Moreover, there was confusion as to what the enhanced
penalties were since section fifty of the collection law addressed the
landing rather than the inspection of goods. 244 These doubts militated
against condemnation.245 By contrast, contemporary renditions of lenity
do not admit that the construction of a statute might depend upon the
consequences that attend violation. “The rule ‘applies only when, after
consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, [the court is] left
with an ambiguous statute.’”246 That is, only “where text, structure, and
history fail to establish that the [g]overnment’s position is unambiguously
correct” does the court “apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity
in [the defendant’s] favor.”247 A statute does not become more ambiguous
simply because it lays down a heavier sentence.248
As summarized by Shon Hopwood, “[t]he Supreme Court’s current
version of lenity is significantly weaker than the historical rule of strict
construction.” 249 Yet, “[s]trict construction is,” in Hopwood’s view,
“normatively superior to the modern rule” and ought therefore to be

241. Id. at 734–36.
242. Id. at 734.
243. Id. at 735.
244. Id. at 735–36.
245. Id. at 736.
246. Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 779, 787 (2020) (quoting United States v.
Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994)); see also Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010).
247. United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994).
248. Granted, however, that extreme breadth or harshness may render a candidate reading of the
statute implausible and even absurd, thereby enhancing the attractiveness of less syntactically
plausible alternatives.
249. Shon Hopwood, Restoring the Historical Rule of Lenity as a Canon, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 918,
931 (2020).
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entrenched as a canon of statutory interpretation. 250 Reprising the fair
notice argument, Hopwood contends that
[w]hen the intended audience is the general public, legislative
history—an ‘obscure and inaccessible source of legal knowledge
for lay audiences’—does not help communicate a statutory term’s
meaning. . . . Because only the text of the statute is the law, fair
warning should be provided by the text in language that laypeople
can understand.”251
The historical rule is also a better guardian of liberty than the modern
one.252 By calibrating the threshold for ambiguity to the severity of the
consequences, strict construction shields defendants from “unfairly harsh
sentences” in a way that lenity does not.253
The survey experiment indicates that the punitiveness of the law does
matter for lay judgments of fair notice, even though judicial invocation of
legislative purpose and history might not. Insofar as the rule of lenity is
justified on grounds of fair warning, regard must be had to the nature of
the conduct prohibited and the magnitude of the sanctions prescribed.
Indeed, courts already seem to be more forgiving when the statute might
otherwise sweep in innocent behavior. Williams v. United States,254 for
instance, held that the deliberate passing of a bad check did not violate 18
U.S.C. § 1014, which made it illegal to
knowingly mak[e] any false statement or report, or willfully
overvalu[e] any land, property or security, for the purpose of
influencing the action of [certain enumerated financial
institutions, among them banks whose deposits are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation], upon any application,
advance, discount, purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase
agreement, commitment, or loan.255
The majority thought that a check was not a statement and “simply a
draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand.” 256 Moreover, “‘false
statement’ is not a term that, in common usage, is often applied to
characterize ‘bad checks.’”257 But “[e]qually as important,” is the fact that
250. Id.
251. Id. at 934, 936 (quoting David S. Louk, The Audiences of Statutes, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 137,
177 (2019)).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 458 U.S. 279 (1982).
255. Id. at 282 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1014).
256. Id. at 285 (quoting U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977)) (internal
quotations omitted).
257. Id. at 286.
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a contrary result “would make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable
conduct a violation of federal law. . . . [I]t means that any check,
knowingly supported by insufficient funds, deposited in a federally
insured bank could give rise to criminal liability, whether or not the
drawer had an intent to defraud.” 258 Rejecting this implication, five
justices invoked the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant while
simultaneously affirming that the rule “does not give courts license to
disregard otherwise applicable enactments.”259 The dissent, by contrast,
thought the “plain language” of the statute to be “sweeping.”260 Writing
for three other colleagues, Justice Marshall was critical of the Court’s
reliance on the technical definition of a check and its blindness to the
realities of commercial life. But tellingly, his opinion began and ended by
reminding the reader that the defendant, “Williams, who was a bank
president, d[id] not, nor c[ould] he, make any credible argument that he
was unaware that his conduct was wrongful . . . . There is no question that
Williams, a bank president, knew that his check-kiting scheme was
wrongful.”261
More recently, Yates v. United States262 affirmed that the disposal of
undersized fish caught in defiance of federal conservation regulations did
not fall under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 which provides a fine or twenty years’
imprisonment for
knowingly . . . destroy[ing] . . . any record, document, or tangible
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.263
The Court examined the structure and text of the law and applied the
canons of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis to cabin the breadth of the
term “tangible object.”264 A four-justice plurality also found support in the
rule of lenity. 265 Per Justice Ginsburg, “[t]hat interpretative principle
[wa]s relevant” where the harsher interpretation of the law “exposes
individuals to 20-year prison sentences for tampering with any physical
object that might have evidentiary value in any federal investigation into
any offense, no matter whether the investigation is pending or merely
contemplated, or whether the offense subject to investigation is criminal
258. Id.
259. Id. at 290.
260. Id. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 293, 305.
262. 574 U.S. 528 (2015).
263. Id. at 531 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519).
264. Id. at 530.
265. Id. at 547–48.
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or civil.” 266 Against this position, the dissent contended that “[l]enity
offers no proper refuge from [a] straightforward (even though capacious)
construction” of “tangible objects.”267 Noting the plurality’s discomfort
with “the disproportionate penalties § 1519 imposes if the law is read
broadly,” Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
intimated that the “real issue” was “overcriminalization and excessive
punishment in the U.S. Code.”268 But judges should express their anxiety
“in lectures, in law review articles, and even in dicta,” and not by
“replac[ing] the statute Congress enacted with an alternative of [their]
own design.”269
Williams and Yates suggest that judicial inquietude about fair notice
does result in statutes being construed more narrowly than their linguistic
meanings might attest. Although it is black letter law that the rule of lenity
“cannot dictate an implausible interpretation of a statute, nor one at odds
with the generally accepted contemporary meaning of a term,”270 and is
only engaged when the court can make “no more than a guess as to what
[the legislature] intended,”271 judges appear to be willing to deviate from
ordinary meaning—or to find ambiguity—when the conduct being
outlawed is “unremarkable” 272 or the result draconian. 273 Conversely,
when the rule of lenity is passed over, the neglect, Scalia and Garner
venture, is borne out “of zeal to smite the wicked. The defendant has
almost always done a bad thing, and the instinct to punish the wrongdoer
is a strong one.”274 Scalia and Garner maintain that “a fair system of laws
requires precision in the definition of offenses and punishments,”275 and
hence that a criminal defendant should receive the benefit of any
ambiguity in language. The evidence presented here augurs in favor of a
266. Id. at 548 (emphasis in original).
267. Id. at 566 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 569.
269. Id. at 570.
270. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 596 (1990).
271. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (quoting United States v. Wells, 519
U.S. 482, 499 (1997)).
272. Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286 (1982).
273. Yates, 574 U.S. at 548.
274. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 301. Compare United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63,
63 (1984) (holding a statute punishing “[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any
false . . . statements” did not require knowledge that false statement was within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States), with Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 419 (1985)
(holding a statute punishing “[w]hoever knowingly uses . . . or possesses coupons or authorization
cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations” required knowledge of illegality
of the use or possession).
275. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12, at 301.
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holistic standard for determining when lenity should apply, one that is
attuned to social norms and expectations. The proposition that the legal
meaning of a statute may vary based on its severity or proportionality will
not endear itself to those textualists who hold that “[a] text should not be
construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be
construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.” 276 But such
variability implements ordinary notions of fair warning.277
C.

Optimus Legum Interpres Consuetudo

Abstracting from the experimental results, if ordinary people’s
expectations of the law are shaped by custom and practice, then fair notice
may dictate that a statute be given its commonly held meaning in
preference to its true ordinary meaning.
The first American treatise on statutory interpretation instructed that
“[o]f a similar value [as judicial precedent] in regard to the construction
of statutes is usage, or the construction which custom or practice has put
on them. Optimus legum interpres consuetudo.” 278 Custom is the best
interpreter of the law. In putting forth this maxim, the author referred to
Cicero and also repeated Lord Coke who held: “It is the common
opinion . . . and communis opinio is of good authoritie [sic] in law. A
communi observantia non est recedendum.” 279 From common practice
there should be no departure. In the United States, the Supreme Court, in
1803—days after handing down Marbury v. Madison280—dismissed the
contention that Supreme Court Justices could not be legislatively directed
276. SCALIA, supra note 20, at 23.
277. It could be argued that a sliding scale standard for the rule of lenity undermines, rather than
vindicates, fair notice because judges may differ as to the wrongfulness of relevant conduct or the
severity or proportionality of the legal consequences and thus render conflicting decisions. There are
two replies to this challenge. First, insofar as courts are already taking these additional considerations
into account when invoking the rule of lenity, making them explicit has at least the virtue of honesty.
Second, even if reasonable people might disagree about the egregiousness of an act or the harshness
of a sentence, such judgments are, in all likelihood, more patterned and less eclectic than guesses
about whether the statutory provision at issue is in “equipoise,” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S.
694, 713 n.13 (2000), or “grievous[ly] ambigu[ous],” Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010).
Under such circumstances, a thumb on the scale makes application of the rule of lenity more, not less,
predictable, even if it cannot eliminate all inconsistency.
278. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION
APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 255 (1857); cf. 1 THE DIGEST OF
JUSTINIAN 14 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds., Alan Watson trans., 1985) (“[O]ptima enim
est legum interpres consuetudo.”).
AND

279. SEDGWICK, supra note 278, at 255 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE,
THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON
LITTLETON 186.a. (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., Luke Hansard & Sons, 16th ed. 1809)
(1628)).
280. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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to preside on the circuit courts, having not been commissioned as circuit
judges.281 “To this objection,” said Justice Paterson,
it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it
for a period of several years, commencing with the organization
of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has
indeed fixed the construction. . . . This practical exposition is too
strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled.282
Six years later, the Supreme Court agreed that a deed acknowledged
before a justice of the supreme court of Pennsylvania was proved “before
one of the justices of the peace of the proper county or city where the lands
lie.” 283 Chief Justice Marshall began by noting that were this the first
occasion for construing the Act of Pennsylvania of 1715, the court would
be bound to hold that a justice of the supreme court not being a justice of
the county, the deed at issue was not properly proved and hence not legally
recorded. But the universal construction placed on the statute by the bar
and bench of Pennsylvania prevailed.284 “[I]n construing the statutes of a
state on which land titles depend, infinite mischief would ensue, should
this court observe a different rule from that which has been long
established in the state,” asserted the Chief Justice.285 “[I]n this case, the
court cannot doubt that the courts of Pennsylvania consider a justice of
the supreme court as within the description of the act.”286 Similarly, the
New York Court of Chancery held that a comptroller’s deed, executed to
a purchaser at a tax sale, was not void even though it had not been done
“in the name of the people of the state” as mandated by statute.287 The
comptroller’s deeds had been issued in the same form for “more than a
quarter of a century.” 288 The Chancellor conceded that “Lord Coke’s
expression . . . that common opinion is good authority in law does not
apply to a mere speculative opinion in the community as to what the law
upon a particular subject is.”289 Yet,
when such opinion has been frequently acted upon, and for a great
length of time, by those whose duty it is to administer the law,
and important individual rights have been acquired or are
dependant [sic] upon such practical construction of the law, this
281. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 309 (1803).
282. Id.
283. McKeen v. Delancy’s Lessee, 9 U.S. 22, 32 (1809).
284. Id. at 33.
285. Id. at 32.
286. Id.
287. Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528, 576 (N.Y. Ch. 1848) (emphasis omitted).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 577.
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expression of the learned commentator upon Littleton is entitled
to great weight.290
Characterizing the non-conformity of the deed to the statutorily
prescribed form as “a mere technicality,” the chancellor declared “[t]he
maxim that custom is the best interpreter of the law . . . applicable to th[e]
case.”291
But despite its ancient pedigree and favorable reception by American
courts in the nineteenth century,292 this canon of statutory construction has
fallen silent. Optimus legum interpres consuetudo—advising judges to
look to the contemporaneous and continuous practice of government
departments to ascertain statutory meaning and legislative intent293—was
subsumed into the Chevron doctrine and thereby “overthrown.” 294 In
establishing judicial deference to executive interpretations of statutes,
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 295 drew on cases that
applied the traditional maxims but “completely and entirely forgot[]” their
true meaning. 296 Beyond administrative interpretations of law, optimus
legum interpres consuetudo has made few, if any, decisive appearances in
recent memory. In Brogan v. United States,297 Justice Scalia denied that
opinio communis, common opinion, could operate to narrow the literal
scope of a criminal statute.298 The statute examined in Brogan, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, forbade the “mak[ing] of any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations” concerning “any matter within the

290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See Bank of U.S. v. Halstead, 23 U.S. 51, 62–63 (1825) (“And if any doubt existed, whether
the act of 1792 vests such power in the Courts, or with respect to its constitutionality, the practical
construction heretofore given to it, ought to have great weight in determining both questions.”); see
also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (recognizing the maxim consuetudo est optimus
interpres legum but rejecting its application to the facts at hand).
293. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 113 U.S. 568, 571 (1884) (“This contemporaneous and
uniform interpretation is entitled to weight in the construction of the law, and in a case of doubt ought
to turn the scale.”); United States v. Hill, 120 U.S. 169, 182 (1887) (“With this long practice,
amounting to a contemporaneous and continuous construction of the statute, in a case where it is
doubtful whether the statute requires a return of the disputed fees, . . . a court seeking to administer
justice would long hesitate before permitting the United States to go back, and not only as against the
clerk, but as against the surety on his bond, reopen what had been settled with such abundant and
formal sanction.”).
294. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J.
908, 1000 (2017) (quoting Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 111 (1904) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
295. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
296. Bamzai, supra note 294, at 1000.
297. 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
298. Id. at 407–08.
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jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.”299
Defendant James Brogan was a union officer who had accepted
unlawful cash payments from a company whose employees were
represented by the union.300 Federal agents from the Department of Labor
and Internal Revenue Service learnt of these payments after a search of
the company’s headquarters. 301 But when they questioned Brogan
whether he had received any money or gifts from the company while
serving as a union officer, Brogan answered “no.”302 Brogan was later
tried and convicted of making a false statement in a matter within the
jurisdiction of a federal department or agency. 303 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, Brogan submitted that the law did not reach a bare denial
of wrongdoing: the “exculpatory no.”304 A number of federal appellate
courts previously held that an exculpatory no did not come within
§ 1001’s prohibition on false statements.305 Moreover, the Department of
Justice had maintained a policy against prosecuting exculpatory noes.
About two decades earlier, in Nunley v. United States, 306 the Solicitor
General petitioned the Court to vacate a § 1001 conviction for an
exculpatory no, proceedings having been instituted without the approval
of the Assistant Attorney General.307 Approval would normally have been
refused.308 Post-Nunley, and at the time Brogan was charged, the United
States Attorney’s Manual spelled out that “[w]here the statement takes the
form of an ‘exculpatory no,’ 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not apply regardless
who asks the question.” 309
Neither circuit precedent nor prosecutorial practice availed Brogan.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Scalia reasoned straightforwardly, that
“[b]y its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 covers ‘any’ false statement—that is, a
false statement ‘of whatever kind.’ The word ‘no’ in response to a
question,” he continued, “assuredly makes a ‘statement.’”310 In dissent,
Justice Stevens called on the Court to “show greater respect for the
299. Id. at 400 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)).
300. Id. at 399.
301. Id. at 400.
302. Id. at 398.
303. Id. at 400.
304. Id. at 401.
305. Id.
306. 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
307. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 414 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 415 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’ys’ Manual § 9-42.160 (1988)).
310. Id. at 400 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (internal
citation omitted)).
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virtually uniform understanding of the bench and the bar that persisted for
decades.” 311 But Justice Scalia thought communis opinio inapposite. 312
“[C]ommunis error facit jus . . . is not the normative basis of th[e] Court’s
jurisprudence,” and the “plain language of § 1001 admits of no exception
for an ‘exculpatory no.’”313
Textualism, at least as espoused by Justice Scalia, accords little
significance to communal interpretation as against ordinary meaning. To
be fair, the old English authorities addressing optimus legum interpres
consuedo and communis opinio acknowledged that usage could not
override clear statutory language. For example, Lord Brougham conceded
in Magistrates of Dunbar v. Duchess of Roxburghe314 that “no usage is of
any avail” where the “statute . . . speak[s] a language plainly and
indubitably differing from the purport of the usage.”315 But if ordinary
people follow the law through observation, imitation, and trial and error,
holding them to the precise letter of the statute—even if it is its ordinary
meaning—could occasion surprise. Fair notice may well require
consuetudo legum interpres consuetudo to be dusted off and restored
among the canons of statutory construction.
CONCLUSION
Textualism has been urged on several grounds. It is said to be mandated
by the separation of powers. When courts attribute a legal meaning to a
statute based on legislative purpose as gleaned from committee reports,
sponsor statements, and floor debates, they permit an end-run around the
constitutional process of bicameral passage and presentment. 316
311. Id. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 408 (majority opinion).
313. Id.
314. (1835) 6 Eng. Rep. 1462; 3 Cl. & Fin. 335 (HL).
315. Id. at 1469; 3 Cl. & F. at 354; see Sheppard v. Gosnold (1672) 124 Eng. Rep. 1018, 1023;
Vaugh. 159, 170 (“[I]f usage hath been against the obvious meaning of an Act of Parliament, by the
vulgar and common acceptation of the words, then it is rather an oppression of those concern’d, [sic]
than an exposition of the Act.”); R. v. Hogg (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1341, 1345; 1 T.R. 721, 728 (KB)
(Sir Nash Grose) ( “[U]sage . . . ought not to be attended to in construing an Act of Parliament, which
cannot admit of different interpretations.”); FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON
STATUTES; AND THEIR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 702 (1835) (“The words of a statute are to be taken
in their ordinary and familiar signification and import, and regard is to be had to their general and
popular use; for jus et norma loquendi is governed by usage; and the meaning of words, spoken or
written, ought to be allowed to be as it has constantly been taken to be:—loquendum est ut vulgus.
But if the usage have been, to construe the words of a statute contrary to their obvious meaning by
the vulgar tongue, and the common acceptation of terms, such usage is not to be regarded, it being
rather, say the books, an oppression of those concerned, than a construction of the statute.” (internal
citations omitted)).
316. Manning, supra note 100, at 707.
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Textualism is also advertised as a device for insulating law from politics.
By making semantic meaning paramount, textualism inhibits judges from
giving vent to their own predilections and prejudices.317 But one of the
most intuitive and seductive arguments for textualism is that of fair
warning: giving statutory language its ordinary meaning ensures that
everyone can know the law and obey it.
After developing two philosophical difficulties for this argument, the
Article presented experimental results that call into question the fair notice
justification of textualism. First, it is not obvious why fair notice is
violated if citizens are informed in advance that statutes will be construed
purposively, and that legislative history will be consulted in the process.
Defenses of textualism in the face of this objection reduce, ultimately, to
empirical claims about the determinacy of the method vis-à-vis its
competitors, claims that are not only disputable but, perhaps, not
susceptible of definitive resolution. Whether semantic or policy context
forecloses more interpretive possibilities is a question that cannot be
answered in the abstract.318 At any rate, the survey experiment detected
no signs that resorting to statutory purpose and history offended ordinary
notions of fair warning. Second, fair warning is not given by statutes in
isolation. We can heed the law without learning it because of the
normative sensibilities and expectations acquired as part of our
assimilation into society. Fair notice thus operates against a background
of norms, values, orientations, and practices. Some acts are known to be
wrongful and the legally prescribed sentence, if proportionate, should not
come as a surprise. Others may be perceived as innocuous, and the law
will have to be unequivocal in penalizing them if it is not to trap the
unwary. The survey experiment demonstrated that the severity of
punishment influenced lay judgments of fair warning.
The evidence adduced thus far lends some color to the idea that, from
the perspective of fair notice, having a stable interpretive regime could be
more important than the choice of any particular one. It also bolsters the
case for returning lenity to its historical roots by demanding greater clarity
of more punitive statutes. The theory and data canvassed here might not
ultimately amount to a fair notice argument against textualism. But they
should give us pause before accepting the relationship between textualism
and fair notice as a necessary or even probable one.

317. See Molot, supra note 31, at 26.
318. See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636,
657 (1999); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 680 (1999).

